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CIfAPTER I
DOWl.8DGE

I.

ASSID.lPtIOlfi Al'D FOUIDATIONS

The l'reatise .2!:. BUPlan Jature l bears the significant subtitle,
-Being an AtteApt to introduce the experiRental Method of ReasonIng into Moral Subjects."
or in the

~arked

BURe found inspiration for this endeav-

success realized in physical science by the in-

troduction of newtonian experiRental

~ethod.

philosophy was only deepening its failure by
ings.

In contrast, be felt
~etaphysica1

Therefore he deterftined to approach the central

philosophy, hUlllan nature, with a new ou.tlook.

reason-

"The only solid

foundation we can give to this science itself ~he science of
Plust be laid on experience and observation. lt2

of

proble~

Ran)

Moreover, "thot we

Rust endeavour to render all our principies as universal as possible • __ 'tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and
any bypothesis that pretends to discover the ultil'late original
qualities of hUNan nature, ought at first to be rejected as pre'David Haft" A Treatise of BURan Jatare, ed. L. A. SelbyBigge (Oxford, 1940). Hereafter the Treatise will be referred
to by the letter 1_

21,

p.

xx.
1

2

SUPlptuous and chiPlerical ... 3 Thus experience is the ·found.ation"
of HUPle's philosophical outlook, the first point of departure, the
last court of appeal.
True to experiPlental, scientific Plethod, HUPle gives us a sort
of laboratory test of this principle of experience.

"Suppose a

person, though endowed with the strongest facult tes of reason and
reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; be would,
indeed,

!~l1ediat~ly

observe a continual succession of objects, and

one event following another; but he would not be able to discover
anything farther."4

It is tbe ·continual succession of objects"

on which HUPle founds his philosophy.
What are the rules which RUPle lays down as governing the use
to which the Rind puts experience? There seePl to be five P1ajor assu~ptions

in HUPle's

epist~ology:

(1) that experience May be ex-

haustively analyzed into eleMents, (2) that every siPlple idea is
the copy of a siMple iPlpression, (3) that what is distinguisbable
is separable, (4) the attraction of association, and (5) philosophical cOPlparison of ideas.• 5

If his insistence on experience

Plakes HUPle's philosophy phenoMenological, and it does, his theory

-

3Ibid., p. xxi.
4David Bu~e, -An Enquiry Concerning Hu~an Understanding,·
HUPle: Theory.2! Knowledge, ed. D. C. Yalden-Thol11son (Edinburgh,
1951), p. 42. Hereafter the Enspiry will be referred to by the
letters EU.
5This list is copied, with one adaption, fro~ Ralph W.
Church, RUPle's Theory 2!. !!l! Understandinfl (London, 1935), p.218.

of know_dge Nakes it logically

ato~istic.

3
Let us exaftine tbe

basic tenets of HURe's theory of knowledge.
First, what are the contents of experienceP."It has been observed,· Rufte says, "that nothing is ever present to tbe

but

~ind

its perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing,

ju~

ing, loving, hating, and thinking tall under this de8i9natioo."6
Generically, then, the contents of experience are perceptions.
And

it is the perceptions tbeJ'lselves that are kn.own and not

thing

01S8

through the perceptions.

nal ano external, is a

~tter

SOl'le-

Moreover, all reality, inter-

ryf perception and experience. Nega-

tively, of course, what 1.s not a Platter of perception and eXperience is not a "atter of knowable reality.
Perceptions further "resolve tbeftselves into two distinct
classes, which I shall call IHPRESSIONSand IDEAS. The difference
between these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with
whicb tbey strike upon the Mind.-7
Mind.

Both are, then, objects of thE

Their difference in tone or liveliness follows their difffl'-

ence in function.

lPlpress"ions are roughly the things we feel, the

prbtitive awarenesses and reactions of Plan. Id.eas are instru1'lents
of thought.

Hu~e

assures us there is little difficulty in under-

standing the difference between ideas and iPlpressi.ons,.

"Everyone

of hiAself will readily perceive tbe difference betwixt feeling
§.!.:., p. 456.

-

7Ibid", p. 1.

and tbinking.- S But HUNe did not recognize this difference by
~aking

ed

ideas and

tbe~

different in kind.

He Merely assign-

a difference in quality or tone.

HUl'le
However~

i~pres8ions

goes on tn tell us that ideas are copies of iMpressions.
to understand bow ideas and

i~pressions

are related we

"lust di stinguish between siPlple and cOl'lplex ideas and. il'lpressions.
For "thot there is in general a

~reat

reseMblance between our

cot"1p1ex iMpressions an1 ideas, yet the rule is not 'Jniversa11y
true, that they are exact copies of each other."9

But HUMe af-

firflls, -every siPlple idea bas a sil'lple illlpression, lfh ich resembles
it.- lO Thus perceptions are either il'lpressions or ideas, both of
which May be siMple or cOMplex; sil'lple ideas are exact copies of
slaple iPlpressions.

Once again it is

even l'Iental reality, is

lA~ediately

~ade

clear that reality,

dependent on experience,

radically on the experience of blpressions.
The last

state~ent

is

tr~e

to such an extent that if we doubt

the validity of any idea (as, for exaMple, HUMC doubts the notion
of sUbstance ll ) we have only to ask ourselves whether such an idea
-be derived from the iNpressions of sensation or reflection."l2

BIbid.

-

'Ibid. , p. 3.
10ill~·

11 Ibid • , p. 15.
l2~., p. 16.

5
If it is not to be found in either category, the idea is to be rejected as of no philosophical use.

Thus all our knowledge of re-

ality is traceable to iMpressions.

Therefore, HURe's starting

point, experience, can be further qualified as sense experience.
This is true not because he says all perceptions are sensations.
In fact, he includes such spiritual acts as judging and loving in
the terN perception.

But he does not distinguish carefully be-

tween spiritual and sensitive faculties and operations.

Thare-

fore, he coufu ses thcf't in pract ice by trea ti ng the\"! Qni vocally and,
thus, lays

hi~self

open to the charge of

BURe I'lakes the furtber point that
solved into si"ple ideas.

bein~

co~plex

"Where-ever the

a sensist.
ideas can be re-

i~agination

perceives a

difference aPlonQ ideas, i 1. can easily produce a separation ... 13
Such a power of the Plind is based ultiAately on the nature of iRpressions, of which it is said, Mthat there are not any two iPlpressions which are perfectly inseparable."14
Plaintains, ".!h!!.!.!!.2!:!!:
ences,

~!h!! ~

~stinc.t

In this regard llu~e

perceptions !!:J! distinct exist-

Mind never perceives any real connexion

a~on9

distinct existences."lS

Therefore, experience is a cOMpound of

Aany integral percepts.

Reality is ato"ic, contrary to what vu1-

13Ibid., p. 10.
l~tIbic1.

-

15Ibid., p. 636. There is a difference of opinion aRong
authors--as-to the interpretation of this passage. A literal interpretation has been given, following NorPlan Ke''lp Sl'li th, The Philoso ..
~ 2! David ~ (London, 1941), p. 558.

6
gar consciousness Nigbt at first attest.

1,

But let us review brief-

and catch up the thread of BUNe's thought.
Thusfar we have considered the cONponents of experience.

HUNe has argued that perceptions are ulti"ately traceable to sense
iNpressions which are atoNic.
are perceptions conjoined.

The next logical question is how

The general order that exists in ftan's

passive reception of sense experience obviously is not caused by
his activity_

The order in Ran's Nental experience is, however,

the direct result of his own activity.

Having. as it were, ex-

aNined the foundations of experience and found tbeM to be atoNic
sense iApressions, he now addresses hi"self to an exaftination of
the structure of experience and the relation of i"pressions and
their copies, ideas.
Bufte's radical disjointing of experience bas been noted and
Nay be sURNed up in three principles: (1) experience Nay be exbaustively analyzed into 8leftents, (2) every siNple idea is the
copy of a slNple iNpression, and (3) wbat is distinguishable is
separable.
diSjointed.

But obviously 'our Nental experience does not appear
Rather, both CORNon unstudied understanding and de-

liberate mental inquiry disclose an orderly Narshaling of ideas.
Hufte prescribes two prinCiples to explain this order: (1) the attraction of association, and (2) philosophical cORparison of

idea~

Neither of these prinCiples iRp1ies an -ablo1ute- quality in-

7
herent in the id.eas involved, by reason of whicb they are interrelated.

Such would be contrary to BURe's theory of the radical

isolation of the events of experience.

He teaches that in ordi-

nary perception events are "naturally" conjoined by experience,
and in studied Mental activity ideas are arbitrarily
But each idea is

ato~ic

co~pared.

and in no way other-related.

DUNe describes the two states of Rind in question in treating
of relations.

-The word RELJ!IOI is cORRonly used in two senses

considerably different froN each other.

Either for that quality,

by which two ideas are connected together in the il'1agination, and
the one naturally introduces the other • • • or for that particular circul'1stance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two
ideas in the faney, we "ay think it proper to cONpare thel't.-~6 In
the forl'ter sense the ideas are said to be naturally related; in
the latter, philosophically_
In the concept of natural relation we note three factors.
The first we have already·seen, naRely, the radical separability
of il'tpressions and consequently of 1deas.

The second, consonant

with the first, is the "liberty £! l2! 1l'tagination ~ transpose ~
chanse !!! ideas.- 17 As a result of this power we have our notion
of a winged steed or a golden "ountain.

However, freedoft of COft-

position would result in a cORpletely casual arrangeftent of ideas
161.,

p. 13.

l7!1!!!., p. 10.

8

(contrary to COAAon experience) without "soAe associating quality,
by which one idea naturally introduces another."18

The attraction

of association is the third, and N6St iAportant, eleftent in the
concept of natural relation.
"This uniting principle

~ODg

ideas is not to be consider'd

as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded
froR the iRagination: nor yet are we to conclude, that without it
the mind cannot join two ideas: for nothing is Nore free than that
faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force • • • "19
This gentle force is "a principle of connection between the diffe~
ent thoughts or ideas of the Aind. w20 Thus, in spite of the atoAic
nature of ideas theNselves, and the cORplete freedoR of iMagination
in uniting ideas, nature points out how ideas are to be related by
the force of 8ssociation. 21 It is said to be nature that points
because this force "Rust be reso1v'd into original qualities of
ha~an nature."22

So the association of ideas Night be referred to

as a sort of natural deterNinisft of the Aind.
The notion of philosophical relation has the first two 81818Ibid.

-

19!.!!!!.
20!g, p. 21.

21The Aajor types of attraction "froft which this association
arises, and by which the Rind is after this Ranner convey'd froft
one idea to another, are three, viz. RESEMBLAICE, CONTIGUITY in
tiRe and place, and CAUSE and EFFECT" (!t p. 11).
22!, p. 13

9

"ents in COfllnon with natural relation, naMely, the atonic nature
of ideas, and the cOfllplete freedoM of ifllagination.

Tbe disti.n-

guisbing fIlark of philosophical relation lies in this, that it is
a relation which, "we extend to nean any particular subject of

cORparison, without connecting principle. ft23
Thus, although natural relation has the gentle force of attraction (provoked, as we shall see f by experience) to vouch for
the extrinsic connection of two ideas, philosophical relation has
no connecting principle, but rests on a coftparison of intrinsic
qualities of ideas "without connecting principle."

Lacking the

gentle force of association, which ·constitute Is)

the connecting

factor in the perceptual situation."24
able only to

co~pare

philosophical relation is

the intrinsic notes of ideas.

Such inquiry

night be fruitful for action and science or not.

It's usefulness

can only be judged. by l'latter-of-fact knowledge.

And natural rela-

tion, through the factor of association
attraction, assures us of

~atter-of-fact

by

the gentle force of

connection.

The end result of his theory of relation is the preservation
of RUNe's theory of atol'lic ideas.
founds the operations of

co~on

For, in natural relation, whicb

understanding, the ideas are not

intrinsically but extrinsically connected by the gentle force of
attraction.

And, in philosophical relation, which founds deliber-

2 3.!!!.!,g • , p • 14.

24Cburch, p. 13.
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ate

~ental

ideas

activity, ideas are

re~ain ato~ic

co~pared,

but not connected.

Thus

even in the orderly progress of experience.

Moreover, as noted above, knowledge of the gentle force of
attraction is ultiAately based on experience.

BUAe says that

"knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by
reasonings ~ priori; but arises entirely froA experience.· 25 Of
course this experience Aeans the history of the refteAbered past
and not the intuition of the
sions.

i~ediate

perception had in iMpres-

However, both are rooted in sense experience.

only all our ideas and

i~pressions,

Thus, not

but their relations to one

another are dependent on sense experience.
It should be noted in passing that the

!! founded on sense experience, and that the

~ental

~ind

activity of

~n

!!!! have tbe

power to abstract an event of experience frOA its ·perceptive situation."

But ideas are "ore than washed out

i~pressionSt

straction does not insulate ideas frOM their neighbors.
sensilA and

ato~is~

and abBURets

are half-truths flowing froft bis natura1isft.

Hen are not naturally deterftined Macbines, or even Riniature planetary systeRs.

The "ost unA.chanical fact about Aan is his living

intellectual response of insigbt into a perceptual situation, his
ability to see into the. events of sense experience, understand
the~ and their relation to other events. 26
25~, p. 26

26Hufte's attack on the Retaphysical and psychological arguNents for freedoft is already taking shape. For there can be no

11
nu~e

confuses the real and logical orders.

procedure could result in his

peoplin~J

Only such a

real! ty with the nU!'lberless

entities created by the principle: what is distinguishable is separable.

WilliaM JaAes has several

co~ents

on this point.

"The

'siNple iMpreSSion' of HU!'le, the 'siAple idea' of Locke are abstractions, never realized in experience w27 "SiMple substantive
tideas,' sensations and their copies, juxtaposed like dOMinoes in
a gafte, but really separate, everything else verbal i11usion,-such is the upshot of tbis view. w28 VIe (HuNel Rakes events rattle against their neighbors as drily as if they were dice in a
box.- 29 "Our reflective !'lind abstracts divers aspects in the
Auchness, as a Nan by looking through a tube Aay liNit his attention to one part after another of a landscape.

But abstraction

is not insulation; and it no !'lore breaks reality than the tube
breaks the landscape.· 30
But we do not intend to give an exbaustive criticisN of
theory of knowledge.

HaR~

Our intention is rather to sketch the out-

freedoM of the will where the intellect can not transcend sense
and Ratter, and can not know anything of the nature of reality,
including the personal self.
27Willia~ JaNes, Psychology, Living Library ed. (Cleveland,

1948), p. 244.

28Jbid., p. 161
29Wil1iaR JaAes, ~ ProbleNs ~ Philosophy (lew York,
1931), p. 198.
30Ibid., p. 199.
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lines of his theory in order the better to understand his tbeory
of will.

At this point it can be said that for

Hu~e

all knowledge

is "founded" on experience, and that he erred in equivalently denying intellectual insight.
There is one epistePlological point that should be alluded to
while we d.i.scuss HUPle's prinCiples of knowledge.

HUl'lets naively

realistic expressions, especially in the Treatise, can lead one to
believe hiM a subjectivist.

He Plakes statePlents like "nothing is
ever present to the Plind but its perceptions.· 3l or "by!!!! I

Aean nothing but the iMpression!! !!!!.w32
Aeans the will is an
Plisjudging the case.
as

synony"o~s

i~pression.

One ~ight think he

10rPlan KePlp Sl'lith warns against

He says "the ePlploYAent of the terPl 'object'

Nith 'iPlpressions' and 'ideas' leads the reader to

think that BUPIe is adopting a subjectivist point of view even Plore
extreP.le than that of Berkeley • • •

Be has given no warning to

his readers that later he will ask theft to distinguish between

i~

press ions as objects of i"'''lodiat8 experience and phYSical bodies
as objects of belief. n33 'Individual statePlents, therefore, Plust
be judged in the light of HUPle's whole doctrine, in whicb case we
Nust affirft the existence of extraNental realities as presented
in consciousness.

3l!, p. 456
32~.f p.

399.

33S~ith, p. 116.
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This concludes the brief sUMary of HUJlle's episteJ1!ologica1
principles.

We have touched the points requisite for an under-

standing of HURe's doctrine of the will.

However, before proceed-

ing to a consideration of will, it is necessary to touch, again
briefly on sOJl!le of his psycbo1igica1 principles.
II. TIlE OPERATION OF HIND

Three areas of cognition are noted in BUNe's theory by Norftan
Kenp Smith.

They are iNmediate awareness, knowledge, and belief.

·These are, first the ilVlediate awareness through which we apprehend all perceptions or ideas ••• secondly, the Rode of aware ..
ness through which, in reflective thinking, we obtain knowledge
in the strictest sense of the terJII ••• and tbird1y, the ftode of
awareness which he entitles be1ief.· 34

These areas are iRp1ied in

the episteftologica1 foundations already exaftined.
pressions fall under the heading of

~JI!Iediate

Ideas and iJl!l-

awareness, natural

relations under belief, and philosophical relations under knowledge
Let us exaftine the three areas.
A. DEHOllSTRATIVE DOWLEDGE

The siJl!lp1est area to treat is that of knowledge or deJl!lonstrative thinking, because it is the Rost

circu~8cribed

in itself, ac-

cording to HUfIle, a nc! the 1"l08t scantily treated by hiM.

34~ •• p.

356.

In intro-

14
ducing tbe topic of the kinds of knowledge HUAe says the following
"All the objects of hUl'lan reason or enquiry "8Y naturally be
d.ivid.ed into two kinds, relations !!!. ideas and t'latters .2! ,fact.
Of the first kind are the sciences of Ge ofte try , Algebra, and ArithJlletic; and in short every affirPl8tion which is either intuitively or de~onstratively certain.- 35 After giving SOMe exa~p1es
froJll

~theJllatics

DUPle arrives at his conclusion.

·Propositions of

this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on wbat is anywhere existent in the universe."36
Thus ftathePlatics, the only exaNple given of relations
deJllonstrates the operation of strict knowledge.

~

ideas,

Ideas, unrelated

and atoJllic, of course, are blended into a coherent systel'l by "fancy· without anyattel'lpt to verify the relationships with Platters
of fact.

Tbe systel'l is rendered consistent by tbe philosophical

relations: reseMblance, identity, space and tiMe, degrees of quality, cause and effect, and proportions in quantity and nUl'lber. 37
HUMe distrusts dePlonstrative knowledge and Metapbysics.

Such

reasoning bas little to contribute to his experil'lental science of
Plan, and be counsels distrust of reflective thinking.

·'Tis usual

with Plathe,mticians to pretend, that those ideas, which are their
objects, are of so refin'd and spiritual a nature, that they fall

35EU

-'

p. 24.

361,ill.
37T

-'

p. 14.

15
not under the conceptIon of fancy, but !'Ilust be cOMprehended by a
pure and intBllectual view • • • The sarlC runs through Plost parts
of philosophy • ••

'Tis easy to sec, why philosophers are so

fond of this notion of

so~e

spiritual and refintd perception •••

But to destroy this artifice, we need but reflect on that principle so oft' insisted on, !h!! all
iPlpressions.,,38

~ ide~s

![!

copy'd

~ ~

The prudent philosopher, ther!, returns to the

great flood of events and there drinks the saving waters of experience.

Experience alone can lead to knowledge of Ratters of

fact, which regulates not only the endeavors of science but tbe
act! ve life of fIlan as well.

Therefore. while granting the value

of deMonstrative thinking for PlatheJllatics and recognizing it as
tbe sphere of philosophical relations, BURe denies tbis shadow
world of arbitrarily arranged ideas the power of beiog of assistance in the practical world.

In everyday life the clarity of iN-

pressions enlightens all useful knowledge.
B. PRACTICAL REASOJ'

The second area of awareness, reasoning of

~atters

of fact,

or, as HUMe calls it, Moral reasoning, is based on belief t 'throug h
which the

has as its objects independently existing, causal~
operative pbysica1 bodies and se1ves.- 39 Tbis is the use of rea~ind

38!ill"

p. 72.

39S~ith, p.

357.
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son had by Plan in everyd.ay, practical experience and by the scientist in his experiPlents.

Thus, -in this theory of belief taken as

a whole, we have HUNefs account of the different ways in which iPlpressions and ideas are so related as to constitute various perceptions of t be fIlind. -40
We have left behind us the rarified atPlosphere of the Aathel'latician and are now breathing the healthy air of cOJllPlon experience.

The first thing to note is that practical reason does not

enjoy the certitude of defllonstrative knowledge.
a Platter of probability.

Rather reason is

Hatter-of-fact relations take on an ap-

pearance of certitude as experience deepens the rut of invariable
occurrence.

This repeated pattern becoPl8s custoPlary, and custOPl

causes the natural relating of ideas through associati on.

Thus w 8

see that the conclusions of practical reason are probable, and
are therefore called belief and not strict knowledge.

Practical

reason is, Ploreover, intiRately connected with the natural relation of cause and effect.

The two points, then, to be considered

are: (1) the probability of belief, and (2) its relation to cause
and effeot.
Reasoning on Platters of faot does not render the t ruth or
certitude of dePlonstrative reasoning. 41

As lil'1ited as strict

knowledge is, it is, nevertheless, certain wi thin these narrow cm-

40Church, p. 193.

-

41EU, p. 24.

17
fines.

But, it Must be noted.

"The contrary of every Ratter of

fact is still possible, because it can never i"ply a contradiction, and is conceivable by the ftind with the

sa~e

facility and

distinctness as if ever so conforAable to reality."42

So

as far

as our practical reason is concerned, it is as easily and truly
said that the sun will not rise tOPlorrowa s the contrary.
Wbat, then, is responsible for the Pleasure of certitude we
have that the sun will rise?

Our only guarantee in the discovery

of truth or falsehood in these contrary

state~ents

is experience.

BUPle notes, "nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever
draw any inference concerning real existence and Aatter of
Thus we see the difference between the judgPlents of dePlonstrative
thinking. which are always true, and those of belief, which depend
on experience for th eir truth or falsehood.

The notion of 11 e

regular riSing of the sun can be exaPlined by the Rind frop! every
angle, but its validity cOPIes not frop! the elaborations of knowledge but frop! the

experie~ce

of sunrise repeated over and over.

Our thinker notes a difficulty here.

All the past experience

iAaginable does not guarantee anything about the future.

"These

two propOSitions are far froft being the saPle, ! have found !h!!
~

! ! Object !!! !lwaY8

42Ibid.

-

43Ibid., p. 26.
44 Ibid •

~

attended!!!!

!!£h ! ! effect and
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! !Eresee 1h!1 other

wbicb !!!. in appearance, si~i1ar
w45 Just because it has alwill be attended with siftilar
.... effects.
........ .....

-

-

~bjects,

--_ -

-

---

ways been thisway in the past is no reason to say that it will
always be this way in the future; and just because it has always
been this way with one object is not to say it will be this way
with siPlilar Objects.

Thus all reasoning based on experience is

probable.

This conclusion drove DUPle to "reasonable" or
ed philosophizing, to "Ritigated Skepticisft.- 46

restra~

Therefore. since reason depends on experience,Hnd since experience speaks for the past and not the future, we can never be
absolutely certain of practical reasoning concerning the future.
There are varying degrees of certitude.
• • •

"Fire has always burned

But there are other causes which bave been found Plore ir·

regular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge."47
We are all aware of this variation of probability and take it into
account in reasoning.

WHere, then, it seeRS evident that when we

transfer the past to the
which will result
events in the

8a~e

fro~

~uture

in order to deterftine the effect

the cause, we transfer all the different

proportion as they have appeared in the past

• • • As a great nUPlber of view do here concur in one

even~

they

fortify and confirN it to the iMagination, (and) beget the senti45Ibid" p. 33.
46Ibid. , p. 40.
47Ibid., p. 58.
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Rent which we call belief.- 48
bility is belief.

It is the link between .a8t and future and b e-

tween thought and fact.
ing.

Thus the strongest forA of proba-

It is the foundation of practical reason-

And of course belief is rooted in experience.
Practical reason proceeds principally by Aeans of the natural

relation of cause and effect.
of fact

see~

"All reasonings concerning Aatters

to be founded on the relation of cause and

~!fect.

By

PleaDS of tbat relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our
lItePlory and senses ... 49

For by JIleans of this relat ion we can argue

to the unseen cause or effect

fro~

its seen correlative.

Letters

received froJll France give knowledge of our friend who is there,
etc. "Had not the presence of an object instantly excited the

id~

as of those objects cONAonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge
Nust have been li",ited to the narrow sphere of our

~8JIlory

and

senses; and we should never have been able to adjust Reans to enis,
or eAp10y our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or
the avoiding of evil."SO
depends

al~ost

Therefore practical reasoning or belief

entirely on the relation of cause and effect.

Tbis area of awareness, called "belief" by NorAan KeRp
could bave any
~oral

nu~ber

reaSOD (this

..e~.,

49Ibid., p. 25.
50Ibid., p. 50

of DafteS to describe it: practical reason,

na~e

p. 59

SRit~

is used occasionally by Hu". biNself),

"
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causal reasoning.

But in every case what is Meant is the experi-

ential, probabl e know1e dge had by everyone.

By using the teM'l

belief, it is not intended to say that all beliefs arc Platter of
reason.

The ex! stance of t.he external world, for exaillple, is be-

lieved, althnugb it can not be proven, according to BUAe. Belief,
rather, tndicates the dependence of practical reason on the two
great beliefs, causality

an~

the existence of the external world.

While dealing with practical reason, it would be good to investigate one of the prifl'lary uses of reason, its function in ROrality.

This will be a good illustration of the second area of

awareness, and will help us in treating of the will.

How does

lJul'le relate reason and Morality, both as regards placing P'loral
acts and judging the Aorality of acts?
RUPle

says cl.early that "reason alone can never be a Aotive 10

any action of the will.,,51

Abstract reason can not supply Plotives

for will action, since it has to do only with relating ideas,
whereas will action is vet'y Much involved in Matters of fact. But
what about practical reason?
action only ind.irectly.

HUJIle says it is connected with will

"'Tis obvious that when we have the pros-

pect of pain or pleasure, we feel a consequent eMotion of aversion

or propon s i. ty • •

•

'Tis also obvious, that this eJllotion rests

not here, but PIlaking us cast our view on every side, cOPlprehends
whatever objects are connected with its original by the relation

SiT, p. 413.

-
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of cause and effect.

flere then reasoni ng t alees place to discover

their relation • • •

Rut ttis evident in this case, that the i"-

pulse arises not fro~ rea~on, but is only directed by it.052

Thus

Hurne places the relationship between Plind and will in practical
and not deMonstrative reason.
trinsic one.

neason does not supply

ing ind:lrectly

b~"

nent to the case.
So
will act.

~uc~

Moreover, the relation is an ex~otives

but only affects will-

presenting the t'Jatter-of-fact rela tions pertiPassion sup~lies the ~otive.53

for reason as actively helping in the production of a

How about the relationship of reason to the l'1orality of

an act already produced?

TracH ti.onally, the Plorali ty of an act is

said to be based on its conforPlity with an objective norl'l.
relationship is perceived by reason and the
or

defor~ity

i . delivered by reason.

-Reason,· as Norl'1an Kel'lp

S~itb

jud~ent

of

This

confor~ity

What is Hurte's theory?

says, "enables us to inforR

ourselves as to the facts; but it does no Plore; it passes no verdict."54

He notes further, "Aoral approval or bla~e arises in the

l'1ind, not as an act of .knowledge but as a feeling to which we are
i!'l1'!edi.ately deterAined."S5
HUAe.

He

cites the following passage froA

"In these sentiJllents then, not in a discovery of relations

52Ibid., p. 414.
53This topic is treatect fully below, p. 29.
54 SI'ti tb, p. 196.
55Ibid., p. 197.
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~f

any kind, do all Noral deterftinations consist.

pretend to

for~

Before we can

any decision of this kind, everything

~ust

known and ascertained on the side of the object or action.
ing reNains but to feel, on our part,

SORe

senti~ent

approbation; whence we pronounce the action
ous."56

cri~inal

be
Noth-

of blaRe or
or virtu-

The Noral sense delivers ~oral judgAents. 57

Once again, reason plays a subordinate part to the sensitive
nature of Aan.

As in the placing of acts reason' did not

the

~ove

will but only inforRed it of the circuAstances of a proposed act,
so in the Aoral judgAent rendered on an act, reason Rerely establishes the circuRstances of the act.

In the

fo~er

case reason is

the slave of a violent passion; in the latter, of a calA passion.
"Reason is and ought only to be the slave of passions, and can
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey theA."58
Thus HUJIle t who has already del'toted del'lonstrative reason to
the status of Merely transposing ideas, now subjects practical
reason, in one of its priqcipal functions, to the passions.

This

weighty reference to the passions brings us to the third area of
awareness within the hUNan Rind, hlpressions, under which HUAe
56David HUl'le, "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Horals,· HURe's Horal and Political Philosophy, ed. Henry D. Aiken
(New York, 1948). p.-z66. Bereafter this Enquiry will be referred
to by the letters ~.
57Th is topic is considered Rore fully below, p. 41.
58!, p. 415.
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classifies the passions.

c.

IH}mDIATE AWARENESS

The third area is, "the

i~ftediate

awareness through which we

apprehend all perceptions, whether passions, sense perceptions, or
i4eas 59 _-a node of awareness which he accepts as being infallible,
and as therefore yielding its own type of
assurance."60

~

facto certainty and

We are pri~ari1y interested in the i~~ediate aware-

ness of iftpressions, that is, passions and sense i~pressions.
Ideas will be ~entioned only in passing. 61 Also, the treat~ent of
the extreNe1y iftportant connection between the passions and hUft8D
activity will be deferred to tile next chapter.

The present dis-

cussion will center wholly on the defini H.on of this area of awareness by tabulating its factors. 62
"All the perceptions of the huftan Rind resolve

th~se1ves

in-

to two distinct kinds, which I sba11 call IMPRESSIONS and IDIAS. • ••

Thos. perceptions, which enter with ROSt force and vio-

lence, we ftay naPie iPipression.; and under this nMe I cOPiprebend

59Id8&1 are understood here as isolated experiences and not
factors in knowledge or belief.
60S Pl itb, p. 356.
61Ideal as copies of iPipressions and their relation to one
anotber by natural association, del'lor18trative reason, and practical reason have already been treated.
62Tbis tabulation is illustrative of HUPle', experi~ental
technique. All these factors can be recognized in the chain of
huftan experience.
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all our sensations, passions and eAotions, as they ftake their
first appearance in the soul ... 63
lApressions (and ideas) are divided first into siAple and

co~plex.64

I~pressions are further divided into "those of SENSA-

TION and those of REFLEXION.

The first kind arises in the soul

originally, froA unknown causes.
lIIeasure fro", our ideas.,,65

The second is derived in a great

Il'lpressions of sensation JIlay be exe"'-

plified by "beat or cold, thirst or hungar, pleasure or pain of
SOMe kind or other.,,66

"Original il'lpressions . . . . without any

antecedent perception arise in the soul, froN the constitution of
the body, froN anilllal spirits, or frOft the application of objects
to the e.xternal organs. tt67 The iPlpressions of reflexion, which
result froA other sensations or ideas, Nay be exeAplified by "desire and aversion, hope and fear.,,68
"passions, deSires, e",otioos ... 69
"The reflective iApressions

Play

The latter are also called
be divided into two kinds,

!!!. the £!!! and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of
63T

-'

p. 1.

64~.t p. 2.

65!ill. , p. 7.
66Ibid. , p. 8.
67Ibid. t p. 275.
68 Ibid • , p. 8.
69Ibid.
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beauty and

defor~ity

in action,

co~position,

and external objects.

Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, yrief and joy,
The cal~ reflective passions are often

pride and hUMility."70

confused, fIu!'le thinks, with reason.
ably by reason, of the

Morali~T

We are said to judge, presuPl-

or beauty of objects.

These judg-

!'lents are actually the result of our l'loral and aesthetic sentiMents, which are calM passions.

RUPle's chapter "Of the causes of

the violent passions" i.ndicates that calPl and violent refers not
only to different classes of passions, but to the experience of
various passions of the saMe kind in different circuMstances. 7l
The passions are also divided into direct and indirect.

"By

direct passions I und.erstand such as arise iflll"lediately frOM good
or evil, frOPl pleasure or pain.

By

indirect such a 5 proceed. fropt

the saI'le principle, by the conjunction of other qualities • • • •
under the indirect I cOPlprehend, pride, hUl'lili ty, aMbition, van ity,
love, batred, envy, pity, Plaliee, generosity, with their dependents.

And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief,

joy, hope, fear, despair, "and security."72
The direct, violent

i~pressions

of reflection, as being pri-

Marily generative of action, are of chief interest in treating the
will.

They are referred to siAply as passions.
70 Ibid., p. 27 6 •

-

-

7lIbid •• p. 418.
72Ibid., p. 276.

-

Any consideration
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of will has been purposely oAitted here, since it is the subject
of the next chapter.
This cOPlpletes the treatAent of the three area. of awareness,
which Plight be called deMonstrative reason (knowledge), practical
reason (belief), and blpressions--including, especially, the passions--(i!l1Flediate awareness).
The first chapter Plight be briefly sUflU'larized as follows.
Hu~e

is consecrated to the experiMental Nethod, and froN the pre-

judice follows his theory of knowledge.

Vulgar consciousness is

the starting point and is conceived as a chain of atoPlic experiences.

These experiences are naturally related in everyday life

by association, although JWlan is able to fIlanipulate ideas by his
powers of deductive reasoning.

However, for deductive reasoning

to be consonant with reality, it Must rely not on deMonstrative
Methods but experience.

Experience alone inforMs us of the nature

of reality, and Plust guide all valid reasoning on matters of fact.
Experience also infor'ls us of the contents of Mind, which a re ide ...
as and blpressions.

The latter include the passions, which are

the principles of direction and drive in hunan activity_
This concludes our brief inspection of flUMe's episteMology
and psychology of Mind.

It hardly seeAS necessary to point out

the rooting of his psychological principles in his episteMology,
but the following points Might be noted.

The theory of philosoph-

ical relations, which arbitrarily and wi thout intrinsic jl,tStification unite atOMic ideas, begets the theory of deMonstrative knowl-
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edge, which has no certitude of Matters of fact.

The theory of

natural relations, which unite atoNic ideas extrinsically and l'lere..
1y

by

association, begets the theory of belief, which is only prc:b-

able knowle dge.

The th eory of atomic ideas itself beget s the iPl-

Plediate awareness of nutllerous, distinct "passions."

And through

it all HUtlle has been

of adherence

~arvelously

true to his

pro~ise

to experience--whether by experience be Meant the reMeMbered past
or irlPlediate awareness.
of inconsistency.

In this respect he can never be accused

But the justification of his radical elllpiri-

cisl'l Plust be questioned.

Are the eXperblental Methods copied frol'l

the science of the Material universe justly applied to the study
of hUMan nature?

Are they adequate?

Or does hUMan nature trans-

cend the Material universe? It is assUMed by HUPle that the

~ethods

are adequately applicable, and therefore that Plan is not More than
the

~aterial

universe in which he lives.

Specifically, in conclu-

sion to this chapter on RUPle's idea of knowledge, !'lan is the slave
of experience and is incapable of riSing above experience in his
intellectual life.
by HUl'le.

In a word, Plan is denied intollectual insight

CHAPTER II
mmAN ACTIVITY

I. THE WILL
Having given

so~e

attention to

and his theory of know"led.ge, we now
involved in his theory of
tor is the will itself.

Hu~ets
co~e

deterMinis~

How does

with the rest of his philosophy?

approach to philosophy

to the factors directly

of the will.

Hu~ets

The first fac-

doctrine of will fit in

Does this doctrine reflect his

theory of knowledge? What is the willi s re1a.tion to reason? To the
passions?

Let us begin by considering a few of

Hu~e's state~ents

about the will.
"Of all
none

t~e i~~ediate

~ore re~arkable

be not COMprehended

effects of pain or pleasure, there is

than the WILL; and tho' properly speaking, it
~ong

the passions, yet as the full understand-

ing of its nature and properties, is necessary to the explanation
of theM, we shall here Make it the subject of our enqu iry ... l

So,

will is not strictly a passion, but is closely bound up with these
fonts of energy and direction.
"I desire it May be observed that by the
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~ill,

I Mean nothing

29
but

th~

internal

i~pression

we feel and !£! conscious of,

!!

~~

knowingll give rise 12. any!!!!!. Plotion .2f. .2.!!!. body, 2!. !!!!! perception of .2!!!. Aind. tt2
an if'lpression

and

tions of l'lankind.

This describes the iltlpression of will--it is

not an idea--which is one of the

~ight

percep-

Like all slAple ir'lpressions it is an ato"lic pefl-

ception related naturally by association to
To which, we

CO~Mon

ask.

oth~r

perceptions.

"The will exerts itself, when either the

good or absence of evil ftay be attained by any action of the
or body.n3

The cir.uMstances, then, of the operation of will,

like the passions theMselves, include good and evil.
and

~ind

I say good

evil, "or in other words pain and pleasure,"4 because the no-

tions are identified by HUl'1e.

Thus the will is associated with,
or ~ounded on,"5 pleasure and pain or good and evil. 6
What other factors is the will related to?

Reason?

If so,

how? 7 "Nothing is l'1ore usual in phi losophy, and even in COf.'1Plon
life, than to talk of the

co~bat

of passion and reason •

• •

In

order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy t I shall endeav-

2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 439.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., p. 438.
6There is SOllle controversy as to whether HUflte should be called a hedonist. However the discussion is not essential to our
thcl'le. The probleM :i.5 treated at sOPie length by Sl'llth, p. 139.

7This problePl was already indicated, p. 21.
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our to prove first, that reason alone can never be a

~otive

to any

action of the will; and second1l, that it can never oppose passion
in the direction of the wll1."8

HUMe succeeds to his satisfaction

and Maintains that although reason is connected with willing, the
relationship is not as usually conceived.

But if reason does not

Plove the wi 11, what <'08S?

"Nothing can oppose or retard the !Plpulse of passion, but a contrary iMpulse. n9 So it is passion

which causes action, while reason according to its nature, acquaints Man with the ~atter-of-fact relations prevailing in the
situation. 10 "In general, we observe, that both these principles
operate on the will."ll

Such operation is not confused or in con-

flict since passion is a real existent whereas reason deals in
representations.

Being of different orders, reason and passion

can not be in conflict.
Thus the factors associated with willing are pleasure and
pain, reason, and passion.

But how are these factors interrelatEd?

How does the psychological act of willing take place?
The first F'lovet'lent in the chaIn of events that leads to
action is in the passions.

hURM

The passions, Norman KaRp SPlith tells

us, "deterAine the ends of conduct, and •• " in deterPlining theft

8Ibid. ; p. 413.
9Ibid. t p. 415.
lOIbid. , p. 416.
llIbid., p. 418.
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supply also the en.rgies required for their pursuit.

They are its

(the will'~ incentives, and decide us in the 'election' to this
or that action. H12 HUPIe tells us negatively of the power and purposiveness of the passions.

"'Tis certain, that no affection of

the hUMan Mind has both a sufficient force, and a proper direction
to counter-balance the love of gain." 13

'rhus the passions are

appetites, tendencies to certain goods.
Moreover, "in the production and conduct of the passions,
there is a certain regular Pl8chanisM, which is susceptible of as
acellrate a disquisi tion, as the laws of Motion, optics, hydrostat-

ics, or any part of natural philosopby.,,14

'I'bis statement is in-

stru1'lental in our characterization of RUPle's theory of hUPlan nat ....
as "Natural J)eterroinis'PI."
!et us briefly look into this
their connection with will action.

~echanics

of the passions in

As enuAerated above, the di-

rect and indirect, and caIN and violent passions are 1'10st in question in the matter of hUl'lan conduct, that is, desire and aversion,
joy and grief, pride and hUl'lility, love and hatred.

Let us see

how a volition coftes about.
DUffie observes that "in order to produce an affection of any

125Mi th, p. 159.

131. p. 492.

Italics added.

14David HUf\1e, EssaY!I, ~oralf Political, ~ Literary, eds.
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, II (London, lR89), 166.

32
kind, 'tis only requisite to present

SOMe

good or evil."lS

This

presentation is necessary unless we are dealing with one of those
direct passions l'lhich arises froM natural iMpulse or instinct.
"Of this kind is the desire of

punish~ent

to our eneMies, and of

happiness to our friends; hungar, lust, and a few other bodily appeti tes.

1'hese passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil,

and proceed not fro~ theft, like the other affections."l6
Supposing, then, that e1 ther a natural iJtlpulse has arisen or
a good has been presented, what follows? "'T1.s obvious, that when
we have the prospect of pain or pleasure froFl any object, we feel
a consequent ef'lotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to
avoid or ePlbrace what will give us tbis uneasiness or satisfaction.
tTis also obvious, that this el'1ot100 rests not here, but Y'laking

U8

cast our view on every Side, cONprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect.
Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation."17
Thus at the first solicitation of emotion we are Moved to reason
about the relationships su.rroanding the desired object.

As noted,
however, reason alone can not produce or prevent a volition. 18

Specifically, reason points out whether the emotion is based on a

1ST

-'

p. 438

16Ibid., p. 439.
17Ibid., p. 414.
18 Ibid • t p. 415.

-
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true appraisal of the situation and whether Means adequate to the
desired and are at hand.
tion than

But reason's office is rather instruc-

~otivation.

Al thou gh reason is reflloved frON direc t influence 011 th e will,

it wou11 be erroneous to assume that the will is ruled by passionate

viol~nce.

passion.

For the will may be moved by a Call'1 or a violent

Passions are

cal~

or violent either naturally--benevo-

lence, love of life. love of children, etc.--or because of the
proxL"Iity of the object--"Uhen 1 a1\ ill1P1ediately threaten'd with
any fJrievous ill, ny fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a

great height, and produce a sensible eNotion. n19
always the violent passion that rules.

And it is not

In fact, "passions influ-

ence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder
they occasion in the

te~per;

but on the contrary • • • when a pas-

sion has once beCOMe a settled principle of action, and is the
predo~inant

inclination of the soul, it

er any sensible ay1tation~~20

co~,only

produces no long-

Thus, even though the passion that

rales the will "1ay not be violent, passion is still the Moving
power of will action.

"A~bition,

avarice, self-love, vanity,

friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in
variolls degrees, and distributed tIlrough society, have been, frOM
the

beginnin~

of the world, and still are, the source of all the

19~., p. 418.
20Jl!!!.

r
actions and enterprises which have ever been observed anong Mankind. "21
The passions rule even when there 1s a confl let of passions.
Bu~e

notes that "an opposition of passions cO;¥'lonly causes a new

~,,"otion

in the spirits, and produces more disorder, than the con-

currence of

a~y

two affections of equal force.

This newsAotion

is easily converted into the predOMinant passion, and increases
its violence, beyond the pitch it wou'd bave arriv'd at had it met
with no oPPo8ition."22

Thus the passions, even Ifhen in conflict.

resolve theMselves into a

~ore

or less violent

i~pulse

"according

to the general character or present disposition of the person."23
And reason, as it can not produce passion, can not control passion.
Nor are there grounds for

appeal1n~

to reason as having such con-

trol, for the control is intrinsic to tbe syste", of passions as
explained.
To SU1'l up.

RUPle's

pleasure and pain,
paln

Play

psychology of will includes four factors:

passio~,

reason, and will.

excite passion or be produced by it.

passion is "founded" on pleasure and pain.

The pleasure and

But in either case,

Passion can be call'l or

violent, but all will activity is based on passion and not reason.
Reason can not cause volition, but instructs a

21m!,

-

p. 85.

22T, p. 421.
23Ibid., p. 418

~an

being

~oved

by
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passion as to the
tion.

l~tter-of-fact

Lastly, the will

~oves

relations obtaining in the situa-

body and

~ind

to the attainNent of

the good in ql.test ion. 24

At this point we
of the will.

Flay

question HUPle on tt,e fundaPien tal nature

\

Is it a generic appetite?

Hu~e

bas spoken of a calA

instinct originally planted in our nature of "the general appetite
to good, and aversion to evil, considered Plorely as such. n25
also says, "the

~ind

He

by an original instinct tends to unite itself

with the good, and to avoid evil.,,26

"All .'lon, tt he notes else-

where, "it is allowed, are equally desirous of bappiness. n27

But

noae of these stateMents is attached to the faculty of wi. 11.

24The critique of BUAe's theory of will that follows is given
JaPles Collins, ! History 2£ Modern European Philosophy (}lilwau ..
tee, 1954). p. 449; "Despite his extreAe language, Hu~e is Noving
here toward a Roderat. pOSition that racoonizes the guiding functi.on of practical reason, the distinctlve contribution of the appetitive powers, and the need for the Rutual il'lpenetration of reason and the appetitive powers in hU!'lan conduct. Dut he is hindered fro~ aChieving a balance &nong these factors, because or his
denial of free choice, his preoccupation wi th the rationalistic
view of reason, and his own difficulties about the relation between reason and experience. Hence be tends to give a watereddown conception of reason in its J'loral function, coalescing it
with the relatively Nild and ~oderate passions. The practical reduction of reason to the Mild passions corresponds t~ the speculative reduction of reason to iPlagi.nation. In neither case does
Hume preserve the distInctive role of reason in hUMan experience.by

25!, p. 417.
26,Iill., p. 438.
27E~1, p. 227.

-
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Therefore, although

Plan

is conceived of as having a general appe-

tite for good, and individual passions seek individual goods. the
will is not conceived of as an appetite for good.
The will is a power at the disposal of all the passions.
bas

co~and

over

body

and

Rentation, the will acts.

~ind,

It

and as the passions require iMple-

"The WILL exerts itself, when either

tbe good or absence of evil Play be attained by any action of tne

Plind or body."28

HUMe is being faithful to his analysis of all

reality into perceptions of experience.

It is certainly true that

the will-in-act is experienced as the power of cO!1'l1"land..

The far

Jl10re subtile notion of will as i.n'tellectual appati ta is t'letaphysical in tbe

extre~e.

But such considerations are to be shunned.

Therefore, although HUl'le says the will effects the PlovePlent to

goot', it is Plan or an individual passion that is satisfied.

The truth is that lJul'le has very little to say about the nature of tbe will.

And the 1i ttle said can only lead to the COD-

clusion th.at the will .is a power of cOPlPland.

ItAn act of volition

produces Plotion in our l!JI'lbs, or raises a new idea in our
t1 on.

il"la~Jina

Th:i.s influence of the will we know by consciousness ."29

We Must conclude that for RUPle the will is not a generic appetite

of man but Merely the power of cOPl!'land he exercises over his body
aDd f1lind.

28T, p. 439.

-
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The balis tor this concept of will aad it. adJuncta ia to be
tound in BUReta at08iatie phenoRenaliSft.

Bis experiential ap-

proach to reality ilolates individual appetites into a nuftber of
ditterent and distinct "paseions."

The process of willing i.

broken up into the before, during, and after of passion, reason,
and cORRand.

Bach pha.e i. erected into an independent e1eftent.

To each pa •• ion i. a •• igned it. own end and energy.

To rea.on is

assigned tbe power of gra'ping Natter-ot-fact relation..
the power of coftftand over bod7 and Rind.

To will,

To pas.ion, the power of

caueing the will to act.
Concerning the pro.le.. of deterftini'A of the will, we can a.,
the following.

In hi. theory of knowledge, RaD is liNited by BURe

to knowledge of individual event..
1iR1ted to willing individual good..
knowing and willing!!! good.

In hi. theory of will, Ran i.
There i. no such thing ae

The result i. that long before BURe

has ever addressed the prable.. of freedoft be hal denied the e1e..ente n80eela17 to

e.tabl~8h

liberty of the will.

II. BTHICJL HAl
There are eeveral Rore factors of hURaD activity which are
prerequisite' to a full understanding of BURe's tr.atftent of freedoft.

They are: (1) virtue and natural ability, (2) good and evil,

and (3) obligation.

In a sen.e BUPle's stand on these t'latters, i.

logically consequent to his theory of deterftination of the will.
However he himself treat. theft iadepeadently, and tbey are of in-
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terelt for the light they throw on

tbe~ethod

he ules in approach-

ing the.e probleml related to the hUNan activity of willing.

Also

the.e "atters are. for BURe, a direct introduction to his consid.
eration of the lIloral argllPlent tor freedo".
A. IATURAL ABILITY AJfD fIRTUB

Two points of interest ari.e in this Ratter: (1) wbat is the
relationship between natural ability and virtue, and (2) what doe.
BUlIIe think of the cOJIlpleltu. of natural abilities, tbat is, teJllper..ent.

As regards the fir.t, there" DO foundation tor a dis-

tinction between natural ability and virtue, according-to RuJlte.
AI to the .econd, Rd. i. logically forced to grant, a nd freely

doe.

10,

that an individual's

purely the result of fortune.
is predeterftined

br

t.JIlpera~ent

and its exercise is

In other words, a

his natural endOWRent.

~ant8

character

And more noteworthy,

his every action is predeterJllined in his teJltper.

Let us take up

first the relationship between natural ability and virtue.
HuJlte notes tbat the dispute about the distinction between tbe
two is a lIlere quibble. 30

Of prinary interest is bis djsJIlissal of

a di.tinction based on voluntary and Meritorious acquisition and
non-voluntary, passive reception of pleasing qualities of character.

Be put. forth tbree objections to a distinction based on

free choice.

Firs!, Plany so-called floral virtues are quite as in-
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voluntary and necessary as qualities. of judgRent and iRagination.
Moreover, al Right say the safte, in 80Re degree, of the others
fPther Virtues] J it being a1P108t iJllpossible for tbe JIlind to cbange
its character in any considerable article, or cure itself of a
pa8.ionate or splenetic te~per, wben they are natural to it._ 31
Thus neitber virtue nor perversity are JIlatter of choice. Second,
virtue and vice are so denoJllinated froPl tbe fact that they give
pleasure or pain, not because tbey are voluntary or involuntary.
Just as beauty or detorNity are not so called because d any voluntary quality, so virtue and vice depend rather on pleasure and
pain.

-.ow I believe no one will assert, that a quality can never

produce pleasure or pain to the person who oonsiders it, unless it
be perfectly Voluntary in the person who possesses it~_32

Third,

since tree will has no intlueQce on theacttons of l1len,neither
bas it influence. on the qualities ofrnen.'

~l'he

fabric and consti-

t.:tion of our nin.i no Plore depends on our choice than t bat of our
body.a33
In addition to these negative conSiderations, Hufte Nakes SOfte
positive

state~ents

about the identification of natural ability

and virtue, and their opposites.
they are quite the

8a~e

It seeRS evident, in .fact, that

thing, for aboth of thePl equally produce

311, p. 608.

-

32Ibid., p. 609.
33David HURe. aThe Sceptic,a BUNe'. Moral and Political Phi1080pby. ed. Henry D. Aiken (lew York, 1948). p:-346.
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pleasure and have of course an equal tendency to procure the love
and esteeM of Aanking."34
b1oRish, a fault, a vice, a

Likewise their opposites agree.
cri~e--these

"A

expressions seeR to de-

note different degrees of censure anl1 disapprobation, which a.re,
however. all of theM, at the bottOR, pretty nearly all the SaMe
kind of species. R35
Since, then, a Man's character is not a Matter of choice, it
J1lust be entirely predeterMined by nature.

"Whoever consi.ders

wi thout prejudice the course of hUMan actions will firid that Mankind are a1P105t f.m"i~ely guided by constituUon and teMper_"36
a

Ran be virtuous, he will act

accnr~ngly.

And if be be perverse

·such a one Rust be allowed entirely incurable, nor is there any
re~edy in phi1osophy."37

It Rust, of course, be conceded that education helps. and
that good habits are a powerful Reans of reforAing the Mind. 38
But ultil'late1y natural tel'lper will win out.

"In a word, hUfIlan

life is !'lore governed by fortune than. by reason. "39
We conclude that, according to RUPie, hUl'lan qualities are to

34T, p. 606.

-

35!,!!, p. 291.
36HuPie, "The Sceptic," p. 346.

-

37Ibid.
38Hul'le's logical right to such a clai~ is hard to see.
39HUfte, "The Sceptic,· p. 355.
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be distinguished solely on the grounds of the pleasure or displeasure th ey cause Plen.

In thi8!,"espMJ.t, natural abi 1 i ty and virtue

are too istinguishable.

And further, since the notionbof volun-

tary and involuntary have no place in

hu~an

ethics, so-called free

acts have no place in the develoPAent of character. Man's teNperaPlent, the vehicle of his iApact on society, is not the result of
reasoned effort, but the gift of fortune.
Hut-ae seePls to confuse tePlperal'lent (natural endoWPIent) and
character (developed personality). Without such a distinction it
seePis blpossible to. explain the cui ti vation and flowering of the
personality of certain less endowed Plen, or, on the other hand,
the deterioration of other highly gifted persons.
B. GOOD A..'fD EnL

As noted above in the treatftent of reason, Ploral judgNent is
a l:'1atter of sentiJllent and not of reason. 40

.Moral judgPlent is the

result of the caIN, reflective iPlpression or passion called rlOral
sentiPient.

But at that point we 4id little JIlore than note HUNe's

teaching in this Natter.

Here we wish to go into the Platter Nore

thoroughly_
"In this view. cleanliness is also to be regarded as a

vjrt~;

since it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is a very
considerable source of love and affection.

40This probleJll was indica ted on p. 22.

No one will deny, that
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a negligence in this particular is a fault; and as faults are
nothing but sMaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin
than the uneasy sensation, which it excites in others, we may in
this instance, seeMingly so trivial, clearly discover the origin
of the J'Iloral distinction of fice and virtue in other instances."4l
Clearly thent Plen judge evil by a certain uneasy sensation in
the presence of the vicious event.

And ·when you pronounce any

action or character to be vicious, you

JlUD

nothin9, but that froR

the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or
bla~e fro~ the conteMplation of it. a42

senti~ent

of

HUl'le holds vJgorously to the view that 1'1orality is a l'latter

of sentiJ'llent and not of reason.
duco or prevent actions.
this particular.

"Mdra1s excite passions, and pro-

Reason of itself is utterly iMpotent in

The rules of J'Iloral!ty, therefore, are not con-

clusions of our reason."43

B. M. Laing points out another of

HUllle's arguNants aijainst the influence of reason.

"The conse-

quences which HW'le draws a,re that l'lora1i ty is not, as

Sotlle

have

held, capable of dePlonstration; for all dePlonstrations rest on relations.

If Morality were derivative fror'l fact\.lal relations, it

would involve relations characteristic of external things and aniRate creatures, and would be equally valid for theft. But this is

411. p. 611.

42!!!!., p. 469 •

• 3~., p. 457.

r
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not the case; it is

8o~ething

peculiarly buman.

Having therefore

rejected reason as the basi. of norality, be Nust find that basis
elsewhere.,,44

Briefly, since all perceptions are either ideas or

iApressions, and Aorality is Dot a Aatter of ideas, it Must be an
iApression.
"Of what nature are these iftpressions, and after what Aanner
do they operate upon us?

Here we cannot reAain long in suspense,

but Plust pronounce the impression arising frOM virtue, to be agreeable, and that proceeding frop! vice to be uneasy.-45
At tbis point HUAe does not ePlphasize the object of Aoral

In his treatAent of free will, however, he is care-

sentiAlnt.

ful to point out the object. "The constant and universal object
of batred or anger is a person or creature endow'd with thougbt
and consciousness.,,46

Thus be teacbes that the adequate object ot

the Noral sentiAent is a person.
Thus good and evi 1 are judgAents or s entblent s or Ploral r eactions arising froft the natural sentiAent of the viewer of a given
hUNan event.

Therefore, according to HUPle, good and evil do not

in any sense inhere in things or events.
Action

~

Character to

~

.!l!!,! you pronounce any

vicious, yOU!!!! nothing

!h! particular Constitution

~

of your Nature yOU!!!! ! Feeling !r

448. M. Laing, David!!!! (London, 1932), p. 189.
451. p. 470

46 Ibid ., p. 411

!h!! !I!!

r
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SentiPient

~

B1Me troPi .!!!! Contegla tion

~!!.

!!£!! Virtue,

!! Sounds, Colours, !!!! ~ Cold, which,
according ~ Plodern Philosophy, !!! not Qualities !!. Objects ~
Perceptioa. !! !h! Hind. w47
therefore, Play

~

cOPlpar'd

This point brings us to the Natter of obligation.

For, al-

thougb reason, grounded in experience and thus being objective and
Rore or less universal, Plight provide SONe nor" of obligation,

s~

tiNent, so Pluch a Platter of tePlperaftent and natural endowPient,
would seeR never to be able to provide an objective and universal
norN of obligation.

How does BUNe provide an objective and uni-

versal Plorality and on what fact does be base the obligation to do
good and avoid evil?

c.
Bu~e

OBLIGATIO.

affirNs that obligation ia a natter of

that it is also universal.

senti~ent,

Tbe source of obligation is

but

s~pathy

with the bUNan species and. a consequent desire for events to be
orderod to the utility and pleasure of the species.
ful and pleasant for

bu~anity

ought to be done.

What is use-

It Plust be noted,

however, that tbis passion of universal SYMpathy ia contained in
the natural endoWPlent of any indi.vidual of the species, with the
result that

SOfta

individuals Ray be naturally endowed with less

than tbe fullness of this sentiPl8nt.

Thus arises the necessity

47David Bu~e, The Letters of David Hune, ed. J. Y. T. Greig,
I (Oxford. 19321, 3~
-- ----
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for external NeaDS to insure the execution of socially useful acts.
We can distinguish two phases in this

argu~ent:

(1) obliga-

tion, as arising froN sYApathy with mankind, and (2) sanction, as
insuring the execution of the dictates of
Right be called

~oral

sy~pathy.

These phases

obligation and physical obligation.

NorRan KeRp SNith observes that "there is, on HUNe's theory
of Norals, DO such thing as Noral obligation, in the strict sense
of the terN.

There is, that is to say, no intrinsically self-jus-

tifying good that with authority can claiA approval.
verdict rests in the
he is a

~eftber

~

The ultiAate

facto constitution of the individual. As

of the species, the

~uNaD

species, we can count on

certain uniforNities of preference; but all individuals have in
SOfte

degree their own special preferences, and. these (so long aa

they continue uncbanged) are aa final for the individual aa the
aore widely prevailing preferences ~ re for the species qua speciea.
The only available aanctions are external; they are due to the
control exercised by the species over the individua1."48
Obligation is aaid to rest on 87Npathy or bUAanity.49

Hu~an-

ity is said to be a universal sentiAent with which nature endows
each and every AeMber of the huftan race.

"One

~an'8

anbition is

48Saith, p. 201.
49Uu1'le's use of the tarA "hul'lanity" Is al'lbiguous. At til'les
he "eans the species of ~en. At other t~es he Pleans ay"pathy,
benevolence, philanthropy, etc. In IOl'le arguAents, as below, he
1'lakes an easy transit froA the abstract idea to the sentiAent.
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not another's, nor will the saPIe event or object satisfy both; but
the hUJllanity of one

is the hUl'lani ty of everyone, and the saPle
object touches this passion in all human creatures.- 50 Frank C.
Sharp

cO~Jllents

Mil

on BUlllets teaching.

"In the Enquiry he affirNs

that regard for others ("buManity") is either universal in the
race or is universal in all those who have not destroyed it by a
career of criPle.

Ignoring tbe deJllands of

as he usually does, JIIorality as a

~atter

~alevolence

and treating,

of the service of others,

he thence concludes to the existence of a code which is valid
either for all or for practically all the JIIeJllbers of the race.,,51
As

a result of this passion

for ourselves.

1f

e hope for otbers what we hope

"Now we have no such extensive concern for society

but froP} sYl'pathy; and consequently 'tis that principle, which
takes us so far out of ourse1ves t as to give uS the

s~e p~asure

or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own a dvantage or loss .,,52
B. MOl l,aing cOl'lt'lents..

consist?

Thence flows obligation ..

"In what does the obligation to a ct justly

There is no natural il'1pulse of justice.

The obligation

is due to the recognition of the utility of society and of rules
of justice; and this utility produces a peculiar pleasure, which

50!!, p. 253 ..
Min~t

51Frank C. Sharp, "Hume's Ethical Theory and Its Critics,"
XXX (A~ri1 1921), 156.

52!, p. 579.

r
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!! the sense of the goodness of justice and!!. the obligation to
act justly_,,53
The basic font of obligation is the desire for happiness.
Our personal happiness depends on the satisfaction of our passions
the passion of

hu~anity

included.

"Whatever contradiction

~ay

vulgarly be supposed between -the selfish and social sentiMents or
dispositions, they are really no Nore opposite than selfish and
aftbitious, selfish and revengeful, selfish and vain.,,54

-All

pas-

-

sions Must be satisfied in one way or another, and all these are
passions.

The

~iser

finds gratification in feeding his avarice.

But unsYARetrical gratification leads not to happiness.

"Inward

peace of l'lind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review
of our conduct--these are
ne8s.,,55

e!rcu~stances

very requisite to happi-

Thus satisfaction of the passion of sYfllpathy is as req-

uisite to happiness as satislaction of sell-interested passions.
And ohligation rests on onets 1esire for happiness.

B. M. Laing sUl'U'larizes RUPlets teaching as follows.
is thus grounded in hUPlan nature, which
this respect it Is analogous to the
in the idea of causation.
53Laing, p. 199.
54.!!!, p. 259.
55~.t p. 261.

ever~~here

ele~ent

"Morality

is uniforA.

In

of necessitl present

The idea of ohligation arises froft, or

r
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rather is, that peculiar experience of pleasure or pain. w56 He
cites the Treatise: "when an action or quality of the Rind pleases
us after a certain

~anner,

we say it is virtuous; and when the

neglect or non-perforI'1ance of it displeases us after! like Planner
we

say that we lie under an obligation to pcrfor~ 1t."57
But, whi:lt if one is underendowed with sYJ'llp,:thy and overendow-

ed with self-interest?
1\:11at if one

does not

~anction

evil?

Wh~.t

if one does not want to be happy?

feel "after a certain 'Planner" about good and

forces the nonconforAist to conforM.

There are various agencies of sanction, for exal1tple, or9anized religion, public opinion,
Ment.

Let

uS

an~

perhaps Most obtious, govern-

investigate the last of these.

HUMan nature has the

lafltentable weakness of allowing itself to be Ploved Plore b} the
here-and-now than by the rePlot., even though the latter is better.

"This is the reason why i.'1en so otten act in con tradiction to their
known interest; and in particular why they prefer any trivial advantage, tha t 1s present, to the t'1a i ntenance of order in soci e-

ty."58
Now, "as 'tis iMpossible to change or correct anything Aaterial in our nature, the ublOst we can do is to change our circum.

56Laing, p. 192.

57!, p. 517.
58~~t p. 535.

r
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stances.- 59

In the present instance the change if effected by

Plaking the desire f or order in societv i1'1I'lanent.

GovernPlent offi-

cials are appointed, who are induoed to Plake the order of society
their priPlary interest and also to constrain others to regularity.
-These persons, then, are not only induced to observe those rules
in their own conduct, but also to constrain others to a like regularity, and enforce the dictates of equity throe the whole society.-60

Thus, eupheftistically, HUlIIe justifies prisons, fines, cap-

ital punishMent, etc.
In

SU1'1Aary,

happiness.

obligation 1s the result of personal desire for

The pass ion of

other passions.

SyPIpa thy

l'Iust be satisfied along with

And should SOMe individual be lacking in sYNpa-

thy, social sanction, the natural outgrowth of Mankind's

s~pathy,

is present to regula te individual acti.vi ty to the pleasure of society.
Throughout HUPle's treatPlent of ethical lIIan runs the notion of
the natural operation of

A~nfs

powers.

Nature directs a Aan's

life by rePlote control, as it were, since Nature has endowed hiPl
with Ploral, aesthetic, and other sentiAents and passions.

It is

by the analysis of tbese natural gifts and their influence that
HUA8

puts forth his theories of the qualities of character, good

and evil, and obligation.

59!!M., p. 537.
60 Ibid •

-

And it is his constant assuAption that

r
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reason and effort have no direct influence on the ethical life of
lIlan, whether he be considered as spectator or agent.

By Pioral

sentiMent and sYMpathy, Nature unerringly supplies whatever intellectual or voluntary effort
Hu~e

~

~ight

In this respect

seeA necessary.

only carrying out bis general principles of

knowled~e

and

volition.
NorAan KePlp SNith notes that his ethical position is only as
strong as his overall position:
I apt not questioning that it [BUMels etbics} sbares in the

defects, and therefore in the insecurities, of his fundaPlental assumptions. Should judgMents genuinely cognitive in
character have to be recognised as entering into belief--as
ul tiPJ.ately, by ip!plication, RUPle h lAself adr'li ts is t he case-the capital positions in his ethiCS, no less than in his general philosophy, will at once be endangered. For if, as then
fo110ws--a further step than HUPle has given any Sign of taking--judgPlents cognitive in character have siPlilarly to be
allowed as enter'ng into all judgPlents of ~oral approval and
disapproval, i.e., if ~oral judg~ents involve judgRents of
apprehension as well as of appreciation, the whole question
of the interrelations of fet1ing and reason--so fundat"lental
in his ethics and fro~ his ethics carried over into his general philosophY--Ray have to be very differently viewed. The
problePJ., too, of Aoral obligation Play then be found to deftand
a quite different answer fropt any that RUPle has been able to
give. On these, as on other questions of theory, Hufte's ethics is integral to his general philosophical outlook, and
stands or falls together with it. 6l
In this chapter we have seen that in
the power of

co~~and.

-

theory will is

It is Ploved by the passions and is not it-

self an ul tiPlate Plover or appetite.
rectly in l'loving the will.
615fti tb, p. 565.

Hu~ets

Nor is reason involved di-

These eleMents of willing have been

~

--------------------------------------------------------------~
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set forth by RUPle according to the place each holds i.n the chain
of

bu~n

experience.

This procedure is in accord with BUPle's

~s

tePlology.
Further, it has been noted that an individual
a uni.que endolflllent, casually Jl1&de by nature.

is

te~peraAent

In view of HU!'le' 8

theory of willing, then, an individual is quite incapable of going
beyond his original endOWRent.
In this theory of Natural DeterPlinisPl, Plan's natural abilities are not to be distinguished froPl his virtues, since both
pleasure in others.

C8aM

Likewtse, vices and faults cause uneas! •• ss.

This feeling of pleasure or uneasiness is the criterion of good
and evil.

The feelings arise froA Plan's Moral sentiPlent.

Man is !'lorally obliged as a result of his desire for happiness.

Sbould an individual not desire his true happiness--as a

result of faulty endowAent--society iPlposes good conduct on biA by
sanction.

Thus Plan is physically obliged to perforPl certain ac-

tions either by his nature 'or by the threat or fact of sanction.
BUAe notes that -there is but one kind of necessity, as there is
but one kind of cause, and that COI'U'lon distinc t ion betwixt Ploral
and phYSical necessity is without any foundation in nature. H62
Hu~e

set out to iAitate Newton's science of tte universe, and

like Newton ended up *ith a deter"ined
te!'l !!!!1 becMe deterMined.
62T t p. 171.

sy8te~.

But in Hurte's sys-

In conclu;ling the treatfllent of HUPle' 8

S2
theory of knowledge, the question was posed whether the basic assu~ption
~an

that the principles of natural science are applicable to

without RodiCication.

1'Ian's active life, the sa1'le

Now in concluding the treatAent of
qu~stion

becol'les Plore urgent.

P'or in

persuing his goal, nUl'le has iPlprisoned, first, Plan's intellect,
and now his will, in the Aaterial eleAent of his nature.
denied intellectual insight and freedoM of the will.

Man is

CHAPTER III
"OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY"
I. OF NECESSITY
Baving

co~pleted

the sketch of

hu~an

knowledge and activity,

we can now consider in detail the problel'! of freedoN of the will,
and understand how

Hu~e

arrived at the position he did.

This

treablent will he presented in two parts: (1) HUPle' s argul'lents fer
necessity, and (2) his answers to certain objections.
Hufte presents one Plinor and one Najor arguAent for
1sl'l.

dete~in-

The Plinor arguPlent be never really set forth forNally.

is frop! the nature or the will.

It

The Plajor argul'lent is the fruit

of his theory of knowledge. and specifically, his theory of causality.

The second he sets forth thoroughly.

Both will be con-

sidered here, first the Plinor, tllen the Plajor.
HuPIe's theory of will bas already been presented.

At this

point it is only necessary to recall the latent deterPiinisl'l in
that U·eory.

HUl'le t s notion of will is radi.cally different froPi

the traditional notion.

His!!!.!! is not an appetite, except in

the trivial sense that its end is to Plove the body and Mind.

It

is Merely power over Rind and body, and is directed by the passions.
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Now to predicate freedoR of such a blind faculty is neanlngless, for freedoA of the will
the body or fllind
Now, althougb

(Man)

Hu~ets

~eans

that the will can deterMine

to do either this or that, or nothing.

will has the power to Nove Nan, it can not

deterRine itself to cause Plan to act.
deterRination.

,dI-

It has no capacity for

It Rerely converts the appetitive iApulses of pas-

sion into bodily or Mental activity.
will can not be free to

dete~ine

~f

itself, therefore, the

hUPlan conduct.

HUPle's definition of will as a power of

co~and,

therefore,

Rakes it iMpossible to attribute freedoR to the will.

Thus his

analysis of the will is in effect an argUMent for d.eteminisPi.
HUPlets second arguNent for deterMinisM is set forth in both
the Treatise and the Enguirl.

Both treatRents are identical in

their handling of this arguAent.
lows.

It Right be sUMPIarized as fol-

"According to RY definitions necessity Plakes an essential

part of causation, and consequently liberty, by

re~ovin9

rePloves also causes, and is the SaNe thing with chance.- l

necessity,
Thus

the SaNe necessity which prevails in the conjunction of Aaterial
events prevail also in psychic events, that is, in Plants vOlitions.
life.

If this is not the cale, the purest chance reigns in

This line of reasoning as

Hu~e

~n'8

developes it is not only an

apology for deterJllinistIt but also a polePlic against the traditional
Metaphysical arguPlent for liberty, as be interprets it.
1I, p. 407.
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Let us begin our consideration by reviewing BURe's theory of
causality.

It has been shown that according to Hufte the independ-

ent events of experience are associated by natural relation. 2
bis natural relation of events is not the result of an inseparable connection perceived between the events, but of the experience of their regular conjunction in the past.

The

~ost

COMMon

natural relation, anti tLe one which is the foundation of practical
reasoning, is caus! .!.!!.!! effect. 3
Hu~e

thus describes his

t~eory

of causality:

It has been observed alroacty, that in no single instance
the ultiAate connexion of any object is di.'coverable either
by our senses or reason, and that we cail never penetrate so
far into the essence and constitution of bodies, as to perceive tl-at principle on which their ~utual influence is
founded. It is their constant union alone with which we are
acquainted; and it is fro~ the constant union that necessity
ari. ses, when the !'lind is deterldned to pass fropt one object
to its usual attendant, an1 infer the existence of one frOM
that of the other. Here then are the two particulars, which
we are to regard as essential to ~cessity, viz. the constant
union and 1Le inference of the l'lind, and wherever we discover
ihese we Must icknowledge a necessity.4
low, as in judging whether one

~ateri.al

event is the neces-

sary cause of another we find two factors, constant union of the)
'Ij)"

two and the inference of the l'lind frol'l one to the other, so we
find this union and inference in psychic events.

BU1'l8 continues

2See p. ,.
3S ee p. 19.

4David RUPle, "An Abstract of A Treatise of H~an Nature,"
HUJlle: !heori 2!.. Knowledge, ed. D. C. Yalden-Thol'lson (Edinburgh,
1951), p. 2 3.
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the above quoted passage.

"Now nothing is

~ore

evident than the

constant union of particular actions [of the wi 1!1 with particular
~otives."5

He adds the following.

"And as there is often a con-

stant conjunction of the actions of the will with their

~otives,

so the inference frop! the one to the other is often as certain as
any reasoning concerning
Ru~e

bo~1es."6

goes on to show how will action fulfills the essential

notes of causality, constant conjunction and Aental inference.
gives

PlaDy

He

exa1'lples of the conjunction of Plotives and actions. 7

However, to this regularity one 1'light ohject, and Maintain that
there are as Many exaPlples of irregularity.

HUMe replies by re-

ducing the probleM to an objection against his general principle
of causality_

There are, he points out, cases of perfectly regu-

lar activity.

And he continues:

But below this there are Many inferior degrees of probability,
nol" does one single contrariety of experi.ment entirely destroy all our reasoning. The Mind balances the contrary experi~ents, and deducting tte inferior froM the superior, proceeds with that degree of assurance or evidence, which rePlains. Even when these contrary experiAents are entirely equal, we reMove not the notion of causes and necessity; but
supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds frop! the operation of contrary and conceal'd causes, we conclude that
chance or indifference lies only in our judgPlent on account
of our' iMperfect knowledge, not in the things thePlselves,
which are in every case equally necessary, tho' to appear5Ibid.

-

6 Ibid ., p. 264.
6S ee , for eXaMple, ~, pp. 85-88.
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ances not equally constant or certain. S
Briefly, irregularity lies not in things but in our
knowledge of
Hu~e

~otives

i~perfect

tbe~.

goes on to show that not only is the constant union of

and actions to be found in

fer actions

fro~

Motives.

hu~an

activity, but that we in-

"The poorest artificer, who labours a-

lone, expects at least the protection of the Magistrate, to insure
bil'l the

enjoy~ent

of the frui ts of his labour.

He also expects.

tbat when he carries his goods to PJarket, or offers theN at a reasonable price, he sball find purchasers • ••

In proportion as

AeD extend their dealings, and render their intercourse witlj others .fllore cOPlplicated t they alway s cOfllprebend, in their schePles of
life, a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect,
froJ'll the proper Aotives, to co-operate witl, their own."9

Thus, in

hUPlan acti.vi ty as in. I'lsrely P'taterial events we observe that Men
infer actions frol'l Notives and that there is constant conjunction
between theA.

The conclusion Must be, feels HuPlc, that hUPlan

actions are deterMined by

·~otives.

In SUI'lMary, therefore, it can be seen that HUl'le concludes to
deterl'lination of the will.
cate

freedo~

of a power of

On the one hand it is absurd to predico~and.

On the other it is quite

clear that "otives cause will acts, and that such causality i1'1-

-----81,

p. 403.

9§!l, p. 91.
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plies necessity.

If necessity is denied, so is causality.

the causaljty is denied, Aan's actions are
dictable

f

and the

~erely

And if

casual, unpre-

result of 1: e purest chance.

In evaluating this position it is good to keep in Aind the
criticisM already l'J.ade of HUMe's concept of the will. lO

There it

is noted that his definition of the will as power of cOPll'land over
\

Plind and body results froM an atoPlistic theory of knowledge.

Al-

so, HUMe's theory of causality finds its source in an ato1'1isPl in
which isolated events need to be related by the I'lind and have no
known intrinsic relation to one another.
ready been criticized. ll

HUAS'S atOPlisPi has al-

OMcardinal point needs evaluation at this ti1'1e.
equated causality and necessity.

BUPle has

"I begin by observing that the

terMS efficacy, agency, power. force, energl, necessity, connexio!
and ~ductive quality, are all nearly synoniPlous. ft12

Further,

"there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of
cause, and that the

distinction betwixt Noral and ~lsical
necessity is without foundation in nature. a13 Thus causality
co~o~

Pleans physical necessity.
Tbis is truly the crucial point in a discussion of freedoA of

lOSee p. 37.
llSee p. 11.

121 , p. 157.
13~., p. 171.
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the will, since liberty can be Plaintained only if l'loti-ves can
cause the will to act and yet not necessitate it.
cause the will to act, no one would deny.

That fIlotives do

Thus, in a sense,

BURets elaboration of the conjunction of Plotives and actions and
the inference of their connection is arguing a point that needs no
argul'lentation.

And that a cause of willing is "necessary" in the

sense that there 1'lust be a sufficient reason for the new deterPlination of the will is also granted by all.

But how do Motives

cause and yet not predeter1'line the will to one course of action?
Hul'Je says they do deterrdne it.

To refute his position and estab.

lish a sound one we l'lust indicate HURe's hidden

~etaphysical

as-

SUPlption.
For RUPle, being is a univocal

te~t

and all being is

Consenuently, all causes are !"Iaterial and necessi tat ing.

~aterial.

Specifi-

cally, ftotives, the acknowledged causes of huftan action, physically necessitate the will.

"Let no one, therefore, put an invidious

construction on My words, b;v sayin,] SiAply, that I assert tl·e necessi ty of hUPlan act ons and place th ept on the saMe footing with
the operations of senseless Platter.

But I ascribe to Platter, that

intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which the Most
rigorous orthodoxy does or l'I.ust allow to belong to the will.,,14
It is all in onets point of viewl
causality, one kind of being.

14~., p. 410.
.

But there is only one kinct of

r
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This suppositi.on of univoci ty, as indicated before,
denied .15

RUPle has ass W1ted an experifllen tal Method.

seePl, indeed t that Plon begin a t tIl e wrong

If

1,8

to be

It would

end of this qu estion

concerning liberty and necesai ty, when the,Y enter upon it by exalllining the facu 1 ties of the soul, the influence of the understand:i.n~h

and the operaH.ons of the will.

Let theM first discuss

a ftore siMple question, naMely, the operations of body and brute
unintelligent Matter. n16 But as Fr. Rickaby points out, his fIleth-

£1 is transforMed into a

"I rOPlark that, though HUPle

Metaphy~ics.

speaks of beginning with Platter, his reasoning not only begins
with t'tatter but ends ther'·'.

He asserts certain facts and lays

down certain laws about the operations of brute agents, and thence
proceeds to extend those laws to intelligent agents, as thOllgh
there were no new facts in the case. nl7

The "Newton of tbe ~loral

Life" can not be given a logical licen8e to apply his scientific
NethOO

to Man

without adaptation to the il'h'laterial nature of

lfJan's

intellect and will.
In reality, being is analogous.
~aterial

body,

has

And, Man. although he has a

a spiritual intellect and will which are only

extrinsically:Jependent on Matter.

Thus HUl'le's law of causality

(granting its validity for the sake of argUMent) •• drawn frOM
15S ee pp. 27 and 51.
l6!lli, p. 96.
nhArA

17(JoSePh Rickaby, S.J. 1 Free Will and Four English PhilosoLondon. 1906), p. l4u.---- ---- --- ----
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physical nature has at Most only analogous application to Man.
Thus RUPlets universal equation of' causality and necessity is not
warranted.
A further point, based on HUl'le's own principle of the proba-

bility of Matters of fact,18 is l'lude by JaMes Collins.
"the causal inference concerns Astter of fact.

He says,

Consequently, on

HUPle's own principles, the only type of necessity that is involved
in historical and statistical inferences is a Aoral one.

If such

a Aoral necessity could be transferred froM. the associative habits
of the spectator to the elections of the agent, it would not elil'llnate the free nature of the cboice.

Moral necessity has no More

than probable weight, and this Erobability is cOl'lpatible with huIrtan freedOPl. n19 Tbus, although HUPle constantly speaks of the necessi ty that holds between l'1otives and actions, he has a logical
right only to probability.

The latter is consonant with true

WreedollJ.
The basic objection,
~o

~owever,

the theory of causality itself.

is not to inconsistencies, but
"The necessary then is not

what always has been, but what in the nature of fuings Must be;
the two ideas are not the

sa~e.

junction, but iAplication.- 20

18 See p. 16.

19Col1ins, p. 440.
20Rickaby, p. 121.

Necessity is not cnnstant conBut HUAe's pheno~enalisA will not
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give knowledge of natures and

Therefore, the radical

i~plication.

source of Hume's deterMinisM of the will is his theory of knowledge.
II. OF LIBERTY
After he establisbes the necessity of human activity, Hume
goes on to show that this is not to sa,' that Man does not enjoy
the truest liberty.

Reproposes four objections thatl'light be

leveled against his position by those who preach a fatuous and
nonexistent "liberty of indifference."

the first difficulty a-

rises about the very word lil)erty itself.
~isunderstanding

The second concerns the

of the feeling of freedoM.

a I'lisrepresentation of the I"!oral order.

The third deals with

And the fourth flows from

our ignorance of God and His connection wi th the world.
Hul'le 's answers vindicate "true" liberty.

Now.

l-ioreo ver in answering

these difficulties he applies his theoretical explanation of Man's
freedom to practical experience.
A. TEIDlINO LOGY

The first difficulty appears to be sil'lply a
owever, such is not the case.
su~~arizes

his whole position.

~atter

of terms.

In fact, in d.u8cussing terAS HUPle
He points out two

ter~inological

onfusions which he believes exist in the traditlonal handling of
be problel'll of liberty.
ne and the saPie.)

(It will be seen that the two are really

The first is between liberty of spontaneity and
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liberty of indifference.

'the second is between liblJrty as opposed

to constraint ana liberty as opposed to necessity.

Hume

affir~s

liberty of spontaneity and liberty as opposed to constraint.

"Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt the liberty of
spontanei tYt as it is called in the schools, a. nn the liberty of
!ndiffer'3nce; betwixt that ,.:nich 18 0PP08' d to viol ance, and that
which means the negation of necessity and causes.

The first is

even the Most COMMon sense of the word; and as 'tis only that
species of liberty, which it concerns us to preserve, our thoughts
have been principally turn'd towards it,

an'J

have aiPlOst univ(:lr-

sally c"lnfounded it with the oH,er. H20
Liberty of spontaneity is opnosed to force, violence, and
constraint.

When a Man is not forced to perforM an action, or

constrained frOM its perforMance, that is, when he is not physically forced or constrained, he has liberty of spontaneity_

This

is the libertYt HUPle says, which alone needs to be preserved by
philosophy_

That other,

necessity and causality_
out cause

altogeth~~r.

l~berty

of indifference, is opposed to

With such liberty a

~an

would act with-

Clearly, such a concept of 1 iberty is erro-

neous and is Maintained by philosophers because they are confused.
The

S8J1le

confusion is not ed by Btu'!e in tll e EnQu iry, where he

teacbes his usual doctrine of liberty of spontaneity but gives it
a new verbal twist.

20 T

-

t

p. 407.

His definition of liberty, if taken out of

r
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context, Might lead one to believe that
ty of exercise.

teaches a true liber-

But the context shows that if

changed, the doctrine has not.
~ean

! Eower of acting

~

of the

l!.il~;

!:UJIlC

~

t he words have

"By liberty, then, we can only

not acting,

accord~~g

1£

~ deter~ina

that is, if we choose to reJ1lain at rest we Nay;

if we cbf'ose to Move we also May.

Now this hypothetical liberty

is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner
and in cha1n8."21

ing.

In the

SaAC

consideratlon

"And if the definition above

~antioned

HUIlie

be

adds the follow-

ad~itted,

liberty,

when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the saMe thing
with chance, which is universally allowed to have no existence. n22

On his own interpretation, then, Hul'te holds tha t liberty, no J'Ilatter how he has defined it, is opposed to
necessity.

constrai~t

and not to

Thus he is free who is not unrter duress, although his

necessitate his actions.

~otives

BUMe conclu1es that if philosophers would realize tbat the
denial of necesslty in hUPlan actions and the affirY'tation of liberty of inrtifference are based on a confusion, all the trouble abnut
freedo~

woulrl pass away.

He exhorts philosophers to believe that

only constraint is opposed to liberty and that when a Plan is not
constrained he has true liberty.23

21EU

-'

p. 98.

22Ibid., p. 99.

-

23Ibid., p. 82.

65
This distinction between liberty of spontaneity and liberty
of indifference is crucial to

Hu~e's

therefore study it very closely.
noted:

(1)

theory of freedoR.

We shall

'fhere are four points to be

the distinction rests on UUJIle's previously presented

theory of causality, (2) it fails to explain certain hUMan facts,
(3) it Aisrepresents true liberty of indifference, and (4) true

liberty of indifference does explain hUfIlan experience.
(1)

HUMe says liberty of spontaneity is opposed to constraint.

A JIlan not physically forced to act otherwise is free to let his
own Plotives cause his will act.

On the other hand, liberty of in-

difference does not refer at all to constraint, but, on HUMe's interpretation, the will acts without Rotive.

Philosophers propose

such liberty in order to say t hat the wi.11 is not necessitated.
Now, the underlying assul'Iption of HUPle's distinction is that cause
and necessity are coextensive.

Thus, liberty of indifference, in

affirJlling that the will is not necessitated, lets the will act
without cause.

And, liberty of spontaneity, although the Plotives

cause and thus necessitate will acts, affirAs "freedoJll" since the
will is not constrained.

However, as has been noted, the equation

of cause and necessity is not to be adRitted. 24

Nor need we admit

this distinction between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference, since it is l'lerely a restatePlent of the equation of
cause and necessity.

24See p. 58.
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(2)

Liberty of spontaneity, despite its nall1e, is neither

freedoPl nor liberty.

It differs in no way froPl the spontane1lUS

PlovePlent of sense appetite or instinct.

It is purely extrinsic

freedoPl of external PlovePlent and not intrinsic freedoJll of will and
choice.

Thus were SOPleone suddenly to throw an object at a Plan,

he would

~Plediately

react to catch the object or deflect it, un-

less his hands were tied.
is on a leash.

And a dog runs to bis Plaster, unless he

Nor should such a cOJllparison seePl out of place.

DUPle hiPlself notes the psychic siPlilarity between Plen and aniPlals.
·The saPle care of avoiding prolixity is the reason why I wave the
exaJ'lination of the will and direct passions, as they appear ill ani~ls;

since nothing is Plore evident, than that they are of the

8aMe nature, and excited by the saAe causes as in hUPlan creatures w2S Therefore HUPle's liberty of spontaneity does not account
for the evident difference between sensible activity in Plen and
anbtals and hUPlan voluntary actions in which we say they are free.
FurtherPlore even when l11en are under constraint, the) are hel
to be free.

Thus prisoners of war, even though tortured, are ex-

pected not to betray their country.
to have abused their freedoPl.

If they do, they are believe

Thus liberty is not opposed to con-

straint.
True freedoPl Plust also be intrinsic.

Extrinsically Man is

the subject of necessary laws like any other Material body.

25 T, p. 448.

-

As
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the heavy body falls naturally and necessarily, as the aniAal is
trained by feeding and beating, so
gravity, hunger, and pain.

~an

in his body is subject to

But '!'lan in his spirit can choose to

step off a cliff or not according to his intrinsic Plotivation.
And only intrinsic freedoPl is true freedopt.

The

~ere

lack of

con~

straint (spontaneity), the freeing froN certain external, physical
laws is not liberty in the true sense of the word.
We 1'1ust conclude, the n, that HUNe t s notion of liberty of spontaneity fails to fulfill the requirements of true freedom.

Liber-

ty of spontaneity leaves certain facts unexplained.
(3) Moreover, RUPle's view of liberty of indifference as

causeless will action is a Misrepresentation of the theory of the
free-will school.

He aSlUPles that by denying a necessary connec-

tion between Motives and actions, they deny a causal connection.
This is not the case.

Liberty of indifference does not rePlove all

causes, it Plerel,v denies the efficacy of all causes but the ultiPlate final cause of ASn to·Plove Man necessarily.
influx of Notives is

affir~ed,

Thus the causal

but their power to necessitate the

will is liMited according to their position in the hierarchy of
hURan ends.
(4)

Thus

~an

is "indifferent" to all but his last end.

True liberty of indifference fully explains facts left

unexplained or contradicted by BURets theory of liberty of spontaneity.

Man is endowed with intellectual power to cOJllprehend in-

dividual good things, bis own ultiMate good, and the relation between

tbe~.

He bas a universal appetite which follows bis intel-
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lect which can perceive the difference between good and!!! good
and thus he knows that he is necessitated only to the good and is
free to choose al'long individual goods.

The will chooses good

things as intellectually perceived.
The will is, then, deterl'lined to its ultil"late end, but its
freedopt lies in the Plul tiple choice of the Means to this end.

The

will act is truly caused by these Means (lIIotives) but not necessitated by anyone of them, as it reMains free to choose one means
rather than another.

Any of the !'leans Play be chosen to a single

final end which Noves the efficient cause to act.
Such a theory of liberty of indifference leaves l'Ian intrinsically free to choose and act.

It is not just a

~atter

of freedol'l

frol'l constraint, or a spontaneous reaction to sti!'luli.

Such free-

dol'l explains why a !"lan, even though in prison, still has freedo"
of the will.

Such a systeA also explains why a Plants Plotives

truly cause his actions and yet do not necessitate thel'l.
Horeover, various !'leans are open to a l'Ian, no one of which
forces his will to act, but anyone of which--under the influence
of the end to which it is directed.-can cause the will to act.
Thus a Nan is l'Iorally responsible for his actions, according to
his choices aftODg l'Ieans. softe good and sOl'le evil.

And thus ftan,

and not God, is responsible for the sin in the world, since Ran
chooses &Rong Nany AeaDS and is not

dete~~ined

by

his created na-

ture to choose certain l'Ieans, sOPle of which !'lay be evil.
DUPle has sUNMed up his theory in the distinction between lib-
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erty (If spontaneity and liberty of i.ndifference.
of indifference as causeless action

~ust

His presentation

be rejected.

And his

presentation of liberty of spontaneity as true liberty Must be rejected.

True liberty of indifference, on the other hand, pre-

serves the causality of "otives and the intrinsic freedo" of
choice between Aotives.
B. THE FEELING OF FREEOOM

The second objection BUAe raises against hiMself is based on
what he considers the l'lisrepresentation of the feeling of freedoA.
It is argued against his theory of deterRination of the will that
in the act of willing we feel that we are free to follow ftore than
one course of action and that we choose the preferred course.
handles this objection the saMe way in the Treatise and the

He

!!-

quirl,26 as follows:
Tbe prevalence of the doctrine of liberty Ray be accounted for frol'l anot her cause, viz. a false sensation or
seePling experience wbich we have, or ~ay have, of liberty of
indifference in l'lany of our actions. • • • Now we May observe that, though in reflecting on hu~n actions we seldoM
feel such a looseness or indifference. but are cOI"lPlonly able
to infere thel'l with considerable certainty froM their Aotives
and fro~ the di spositions of the agent. Yet i.t frequently
happens that, in perf~in9 the actions the~selves, we are
sensible of sORetaing like it (Liberti]: and as all resePlbllng objects are readily taken for each other, this has been
e~ployed as a det'tonstrative and even intuitive proof of hUl'I8n
liberty. • • • And it seeMS certain that, however we ~ay iAagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can
26 ft p. 408; EU, p. 97.

-

-
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cOPlJllonly infere our actions frofll our f110tives and character. 27
JaPles Collins COMPlents on this argufIlentation.
fro~

a deterPlination in tbe

~pectator's

tion of the agent's conduct. tt28
objection

fro~

introspection.

"He argues

knowledge to a deterNina-

Thus HUfIle JIlisses the point of the

In effect be says that sucb inter-

nal data can not be true because it is not in conforPlity with the
previously explained theory of deterPlination.
An even Plore basic fallacy is to be found in this present
line of reasoning.

Tbe objection froft introspection is placed a-

gainst the prePlise of deterJllinisPl, and HUPle answers the objeetion
by reaffirJlling the prePlise1

As. Fr. Rickaby says, -the defects of

the preJllisses are Plade good by begging what should have been
proved. ,,29

For here HUPle supposes that our introspection is erro-

neous because our wills, as be feels he bas already proven, can
not be free.
HUPle seePlI to perceive the weakness of his position against
this arguPlent frop! introspt!ction and attel'1pts to disprove the evidence of consciousness.

In effect be states that there is no evi-

dance for consciousness of freedoPl because no one can prove it exists.

"We feel that our actions are subject to nothing; because

when by a denial of it we are provodtd to try, we feel that it

27EU, p. 9 7 •

-

28Collins, p. 440.
29riCkabYt p. 128.
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~oves

easily every way, and produces an

that side, on which it did not settle.

of itself even on

i~age

This

tion, we perswade ourselves, could have been

i~age

or faint

co~pleated

AO-

into the

thing itself; because, shou'd that be deny·d, we find, upon second
trial, that it can.

.But tbese efforts are all in vain; and what-

ever capricious and irregular actions we

~ay perfor~;

we can never

free ourselves frol"l the bonfls of necessity."30
HUl'le argues that the only way 'We could prove we are free, as
our conscience testifies, is to reduplicate the circu1"lstances and
perforM SOPle other action.
work,

na~ely,

But even here there is a I'lotive at

the desire to prove ourselves free.

Therefore, tbe

instance only goes to show that we are necessitated.
Collins wonders, "bow the desire to display a nonexistent
freedoft can Mysteriously arise in hUAan experience. n31 But the
deeper point at issue, evidence provided by personal intellectual
experience, has already been settled by HU1"le. 32
intellectual nature,

testi~ony

of things and ideas wbich goes be-

yond il'lpr essi ons is not to be adMi tt ed.
of

freedo~

is not an

upon it is false.
ical

argu~ent

for

-

i~pression

Thus the "faint Plot ion"

and any atteMpted proof dependent

Ru"e's rejection, therefore, of this psychologrreedo~ ste~s

30T, p. 408.
31Co1lins, p. 441.
32See p. 10.

Evidence of an

directly frOM his theory of knowl-

i
,.1
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edge, and his denial of true intellectual insight into the Aotiva.
tlon of our own free activities.
That we have such insight is born out in our striving for
i

personal happiness.

We are well aware that certain

!

Ae~s,

per-

haps Aore difficult here and now, will better brinl.1 abJull! our hap.,

piness ttan others.

I

\

!

!

Happily we choose the better f'lean;.,or unhap1

pily we ch 00S8 otherwise.

\

But in ei ther case we know 1hal~ the

Pleans are not tbel'lselves happiness.

And we know that \he1'1eans

are chosen to attain happiness, and that .arious I'leans!are apt to
I

the desired goal.

And we are also quite conscious in Choosing one

Pleans to happiness that that

~ans

I

in itself did not n.cessitate

us to its choice, and that we could, if we so wished,
another Pleans instead.

This consiliul'l furnishes an

~~ve

exa~p1e

chosen
of the

intelligent insight we have into the Notivation of our activities.
And consciousness of our choice based on this £pnsi1iul'l is valid
t88til'lony to our genuine freedol'l.
The evidence of consciousness presents a difficulty for HW'!e,
one wbich he can overcol'le, in fact, only by denying that evidence.
True freedofll of indifference, on the other hand, finds in the consciousness of freedoft a verification.

Consciousness testifies to

a diversity of l'J.eans wbich are conSidered, and one of which is
I

freely chosen in order to attain the desired end.
C. THE MOP.AL ORDER
Hu~e

foresees a third objection to his theory of deterAinisl'l

," I

arising

fro~

the Aoral order.
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It Night be said that his doctrine

would endanger ralig i on and fIlorali ty.
to

atfir~,

But he would. "dare venture

that the doctrine of necessity, according to My expla-

nation of it, is not only innocent, but even advantageous to religion and ~arality."33
not tor

~ants

~aintains,

Thus he finds in the ~oral order a proof,

freedofll, but for his deterfllina1ion.

Liberty, be

is incofllpatible with the ifllputation of responsibility

and M.th the influence of sanction.

Thus only necessity can ex-

plain and save the fIloral order as we know it.

The argufIlentation

is fIlainly positive, but by ifllplication the traditional argufllent
for freedol'l froA the l'loral order is IPipugned.

Let us exaPline

HUflle's vindication of necessity as essential to the concepts of
sanction and responsibility.
After reciting his principles of constant conjunction of fIlOtives and actions and the universal inference frofll one to the other by fIlankind, be states that the necessity thus proven is essential to all law, hUrlan and divine.
wards and

punish~nts,

"All laws being founded on re-

it is supposed as a

funda~ental

principle

that these fIlotives have a regular and uniforPJ. influence on the
~ind;

and

both produce the good and prevent the evil actions.

We

!'lay give to this influence what nafllc we please; but, as it is usually conjoined with the action, it Nust be esteeRed a cause, and
be looked upon as an instance of that necessity which we would
33!, p. 409.

here established. w34
An unexpressed conclusion of this
can not explain sanction.

argu~ent

is that liberty

For, were liberty of indifference en-

joyed by Nen, sanctions could not be

~otives,

!!2 fIIotive which could cause action.

But, as it is an oh,erved

fact that sanctions do influence
liberty of indifference.
tion an

afrir~ation

hu~an

since there would be

actions,

~en

do not have

Thus HUAe finds in his teaching on sanc-

of his deterfllinisfIl and an argUAent against

liberty of indifference.
Let us note several points about this argul'lent froA sanction.
BUAe's allusion to laws as "founded" on sanction indicates his
positivistic approach to law.

Both his theory of knowledge, which

does not allow Nan to know the laws, or natures, of things, and
his theory of sanction,35 which Nakes all agencies of sanction
extrinsic to fIIan, preclude the possibility of a concept of natural

law.
SONe

He presents a theory of justice as an artificial virtue at
length in Book III of the Treatise.
HUAe looks upon sanction as one of

ence Aen.

~ny

Motives which influ-

It can not be denied that sanctions do influence fIIen.

However, BUAe does not consider the essential question of the purpose, beyond that of Plotivation, or the ecp ity of sanctions Pleted
out to Plen.
34EU

-'

1

In other words, although he uses the unqualified

p. 101.

35 See p. 48.
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ter~

"sanction," his

~eaning

is always ·sanction as Motivo."

This restriction of the Aeaning of sanction to its influence
on Nen fits in with the Manner in which HUMB uses sanction as a
confirMatory proof for deter1'linisPl of the will.
which is principally to be criticized.
prove his

~enBral

It is this proof

Hul'lo is atteMpting to

principle, that influencing Motives necessitate

tbe will, by illustrating it frOM the COAl'lOn eAploYl'lent of sanctions.

Thereby, he hopes to justify his deterMinisM in the Moral

and religious spheres.

In the particular case of sanctions, which

are acknowledged to influence the will, there is a constant conjunction between l'lotives and actions.
confir~ation

of

But this. he says, is a

the general principle of the necessity between

tives and acti.ons.

~o

Therefore, the general principle is placed on

a stronger footing.
However, it is to be noted, that if there were necessity, as
Rutile claill'ls, the.!!!!!. actions would always follow in the SMe cop!pI ete CirCIlt'1stances.

In particular, si Milar sanctions would al-

ways effect siMilar actions.

Tbis Hm'le asserts is the case.

"These Mot i ves have a regular and uniforp! influence on the t'lind."
But such a stateftent needs to be proven, not just asserted.

As a

Matter of fact, the evidence would seeM to indicate a general ineffectiveness of sanction.

Witness growing adult and juvenile de-

linquency, and perennially crowded prisons.

Therefore, we Must

conclude that BUPle's theory does not give a satisfactory explanation of hut'lan experience.
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On the other hand, the free will theory already eXplained
does fit the facts of the case.

The reward or pUniSnftlent for per-

forl'lling a certain action is one of !'lany
influence the will.

AO

Uves which are apt to

However, no one Aotive necessitates the will,

and the will freely chooses the course of action it will follow.
This explains our experience that sanctions cOMMonly do influence
the will, but not in every case.
Hu~e

goes on to consider responsibility.

lie begins frOA the

fact that we censure or approve only personal actions of l'Ilen, that
is, actions which arise frol'll the very character of Man and are not
Merely casual and accidental. 36 But on the supposition of liberty
of indifference, he says, there is no connection between a Man's
character and bis actions.

"According t'l the principle, there-

fore, which denies necessity, and consequently causes, a Man is as
pure and untainted after having

co~~itted

the !'Ilost horrid criAe as

at the first AOAent of his birth. nor is his character anywise
cerned in his actions,

si~ce

co~

they are not derived frOM it, and the

wickedness of the one can never be used as proof of the depravity
of the ot her. ,,37

Therefore, liberty of :lndifference is incoPipati ...

ble with responsibility_
Only on the supposition of liberty of spontaneity can the

pe~

son be justly censured or praised for his actions, for only then

36 See p. 43.
37!Q, p. 101.

77
can we be sure that his actions are truly the Manifestations of
his character.

HUPle says that, "liberty, according to the defini ...

tion above Plentioned, in which all illen agree [They dol), is also
essential to Plorality, and • • • no hUPlan actions, where it is
wanting, are susceptible of any Moral qualities, or can be objects
either of approbation or dislike.
our Ploral

senti~ent

For as actions are objects of

as far only as they are indications of the in ...

ternal character, passions, and affections; it is ifllpossible that
they give rise to praise or

bla~e,

when they proceed not frOM

these pri.nciples, but are derived altogether frOM external viole nce. ,,38
~otives

Thus only where causal l1ecessi ty is in evidence between

and actions is the notion of responsibility verified.

And

as Plen universally acknowledge the concept of responsibility, they
iPlp1icit1y acknowledge liberty of spontaneity only.
The Plain force of this arguPlent is negative.

It goes: since

liberty of indifference can not explain responsibility, and since
liberty of spontaneity

co~ects

the precise point in which liberty

of indifference is in error, the latter Plust be true.

Or. since

liberty of indifference Means causeless act on, and since liberty
of spontaneity

e~pbasize5

a caused action, only the latter can be

the true explanation of a responsibility which everyone acknowledges to exi st.

However, as already noted, it is siJ'lply false

38 Ibid., p. 102.

-
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to saw that true liberty of indifference Means causeless action. 39
Further1'lore, }recisely in affiming a necessary causal connection
between character

and

actions, liberty of spontaneity rel'loves all

responsibility, since a MaD is not responsible for an action he is
bound to perforct}.
Responsibility is had only where the agent could have acted
otherwise.

Now in RuPle's syste1'1 of natural deterPlinisJ'l, no agent

can act ot herwise Ulan the necessary laws of hts character and
circuPlstances allow.

On

the other hand, a systelll which proposes

true liberty of indifference allows an agent to have various
tives which Ray be chosen as l'leans to desired goals.

~o

Thus only in

the latter is freedo1'l and rosponsibility possible.
RUPle supposes that wherever there is a cause of action, based
on

SOMe

!'lottve, there is always necessity.

He aSSUMes deterI1inis1'l

of the will which }recludes free choice aMong real alternatives.
This is false.

It is precisely the presence of various !'lotives

and the possi bility of choice arqong various Pleans to a desired
goal, which Makes freedoM and responsibility possible.
HUJ:l1e bas further obscured the proh1e tt by confusing tePlpera'

!!!!!.1

and cbaract er, 40

It is true tha. t a

Flan

is born with his t

peraJl'lent, and that his actions Manifest his teMperaMent.
character, or the 1ac1-; of it, nrows and is fIlolded

39S ee p. 67.
'OSee p. 41.

by

But

freely en-

ePl-
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couraging or restraining teftperaAent.
experience that a Ran

~ay

It is a Ratter of

co~on

i"prove on his teMperaRent if he chooses

to do so, and this results in bis true character, for which he is
really responsible.

Character is the result of free activity; it

is not the cause of deterftined activity_

D. THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF EVIL
BURe foresees a fourth objection to his
goodness of the Creator.

deterRinis~ fro~

the

He draws a picture of the consequences

of his systeR in the darkest colors.

"This is an objection which

HURe urges against hiftself with a vivacity and force that deserves
the best thanks of his opponents. n41

In proposing the objection

and indicating what he thinks of it, BURe hopes to locate his
philosophy where he thinks it belongs.

In fact, be bopes to re-

strict all philosophy "to her true and proper province, the exaRination of co~on 1ife.· 42 As a Ratter of fact in the end he virtually adRi1s that he is unable to rp.conci1e his systet'l with God's
goodness, but "the failure does not worry hiN very ftuch. n43
DURa

puts the objection as follows.

He says that

if voluntary actions be subjected to the s~e laws of necessity with the operations of Ratter, there is a continued

41Rickaby, p. 160.
42 EU , p. 107.

-

!!!!

Theory

!!!. Knowledge

~

I}
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chain of necessary causes, preordained and predeterftined,
reaching fro~ the original cause of all, to every 8ingle volition of every hu~an creature. 10 contingency anywhere in
the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While in act, we
are at the sa~e tiAe, acted upon. The ultiAate Author or all
our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed
~otion on this i~Aense Aachine, and placed all beings in that
particular position, whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable necessity, Rust result. HUMan actions, therefore,
either can have no ftoral turpitude at all, as proceeding fro"
80 good a cause; or if they have any turpitude, they Aust involve our Creator in the saAe guilt, while he is acknowledged
to be their ul tb!ate . cause and. author .44
Nor should one

assu~e

tbat here HUAe is Aerely urging a truAped up

objection against hb.self.

He has said elsewhere tbat Plan t s char-

acter, and consequently his actions, are pre4eterftined by nature~5
It is to be noted that this objection is correctly leveled at
liberty of spontaneity and has no force against true liberty of
indifference.

The latter allows

~an

free choice aNong various

Means and therefore true responsibility.

Therefore,

~an

is re-

sponsible for sin in the world and not God.
HUNe answers the first horn of his
have no turpitude, by

~aintaining

dile~a,

that hUMan

that regardless of speculative

evidence to the contrary evil actions are indeed evil..
two full pages of the Enguirl to do so.46
involve~ent

He uses

As to the second born,

of God in evil, he confesses little can be said.

44IDl , p. 103 ..

45 See p. 40.
46~, pp. 104-106.

acti~

He
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spends a short paragraph saying it.47

It "admits of not so easy

and sati.sfactory an answer, nor is it possible to explain distinctly bow the Deity can be the fAAediate cause of all the actions of Men, without being the author of sin and Noral turpitude.
These are Plysteries which Mere natural and unassisted reason is
very unfit to handle.· 48

One cOPlmentator rel'l8rks the following_

"He concluded that this is a 'Aystery' whicb reason cannot fatboM
(for wbich, read, in accordance with the canons of HUPlean exegesis, that we Plust indeed iPlpute ain to God.)"49
Our criticisPl of HUAe's stand will be that of Fr. Rickaby_
"There is a certain vulpine hUPlility in all this.

But it had been

Plore honest either to adNit the objection as valid and unanswerable, an adPlission tantaftount to a denial of God--for a bad god is
no god at all; or else to repudiate that HUMian doctrine frol'l
which the whole objection proceeds, that tvo1untary actions be
subjected to the saAe laws of necessity with the operations of
Platter.' "50

In other words, }lulIIe placed U,e u1 tiPsate objection

against his own systeM, was unable to answer it, but was likewise
unwilling to Modify his systeR.

47BU, p. 106

-

48 Ibid •

-

49W. I. Matson, "On the Irrelevance of Free-will to Moral Responsibility, and the Vacuity of the Latter," ~, LXV (October
1956), 493.
:

1

50 Rickaby, p. 161.
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HUl'le's only atteMpt to Pleet this problem is a retreat into
skepticisR.

pleads that the !'lind be restricted within the

He

bounds set down for it in previous considerations.

Over and above

this adAonition, D. G. C. MacNabb notes, there is another atteApted solution in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Re1igion. 51 This
co~~entator

says the following of HUMe.

"What he actually says

elsewhere is that !'loral sentiNents have their origin in hUMan nature and

society. • • •

hu~an

therefore, no

~ore

God is not a

sense in calling

hi~

hu~an

being; there is,

unjust or unkind than

there is in calliny an alligator unjust or unkind.

Experience

affords no evidence that the Creator's sentiMents are at all siMilar to ours •• 52

But thi s line of reasoning is just a ~ore verbose

retreat into skepticist'l.

For, it is also an ad.Mission

0

f the pos-

sibility of evil in God, and by eMphasiZing the liMitation of
knowledge to "experience" it reiterates

skepticis~

about "nonexpe-

rienced" things.
Thus here in the final stage of our consideration of deter~inis~

of the will

Hu~e hi~self

directs us back to the beginnings

of his philosophy, to his theory of knowledge.

HUMe bas been con-

sistent in applying He Method of his approach, "Being an AtteI'lpt
to introduce the experiI'lental Method of Reasoning into Moral Sub5lDavid Hu~et BURe's DialoZues Concerning Natural Religion,
Norl'lan
XePlp SPlith t 2nd ed. Edinburgh, 1947), p. 198.
ed.
52MacEabb, p. 203.
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jects."

The result is philosophical skepticisM, the denial of

free will (which also involves a denial of Moral responsibility),
and the iftputation of all evil to God.
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